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ABSTRACT 
  In recent years, constitutional theorists have attended to the 
unwritten aspects of American constitutionalism and, relatedly, to the 
ways in which the constitutional text can be “constructed” upon by 
various materials. This Article takes a different approach. Instead of 
considering how various materials can supplement or implement the 
constitutional text, it focuses on how the text itself is often partially 
constructed in American constitutional practice. Although interpreters 
typically regard clear text as controlling, this Article contends that 
whether the text is perceived to be clear is often affected by various 
“modalities” of constitutional interpretation that are normally thought 
to come into play only after the text is found to be vague or 
ambiguous: the purpose of a constitutional provision, structural 
inferences, understandings of the national ethos, consequentialist 
considerations, customary practice, and judicial and nonjudicial 
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precedent. The constraining effect of clear text, in other words, is 
partially constructed by considerations that are commonly regarded 
as extratextual. This phenomenon of constructed constraint unsettles 
certain distinctions drawn by modern theorists: between interpretation 
and construction, between the written and the unwritten constitutions, 
and between the Constitution and the “Constitution outside the 
Constitution.” Although primarily descriptive, this Article also 
suggests that constructed constraint produces benefits for the 
constitutional system by helping interpreters negotiate tensions within 
democratic constitutionalism. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Constitutional theorists are increasingly focused on the 
nontextual aspects of the U.S. Constitution. Recent work has 
addressed, for example, the existence in the United States of an 
“unwritten Constitution,”1 and, relatedly, the ways in which historical 
events and precedent can create “constitutional constructions,” as 
distinct from interpretations of the constitutional text.2 This effort to 
look beyond what is canonically regarded as the Constitution is also 
evident in theories of the “Constitution outside the Constitution,”3 
and in the consideration of unwritten “constitutional conventions.”4 A 
common theme in these writings is the way in which various 
materials, which are sometimes called the “small-c” constitution, 
supplement, implement, or interact with the constitutional text, which 
is referred to as the “big-C” Constitution.5 In developing this theme, 
 
 1. See generally, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: THE 
PRECEDENTS AND PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY (2012); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, THE INVISIBLE 
CONSTITUTION (2008); Stephen E. Sachs, The “Unwritten Constitution” and Unwritten Law, 
2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1797; Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and the Unwritten Constitution, 2013 
U. ILL. L. REV. 1935. 
 2. See generally, e.g., JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM (2011); DAVID A. STRAUSS, 
THE LIVING CONSTITUTION (2010); KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING (1999); Mitchell N. 
Berman, Constitutional Constructions and Constitutional Decision Rules: Thoughts on the 
Carving of Implementation Space, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 39 (2010); Mitchell N. Berman, 
Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1 (2004); Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and 
Constitutional Construction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 453 (2013). 
 3. See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: 
THE NEW AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 1–28 (2010); MARK TUSHNET, WHY THE CONSTITUTION 
MATTERS 6–9 (2010). See generally, e.g., Ernest A. Young, The Constitution Outside the 
Constitution, 117 YALE L.J. 408 (2007).  
 4. See generally Adrian Vermeule, Conventions in Court 1 (Harvard Law Sch. Pub. Law 
Working Paper Grp., Paper No. 13–46), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2354491 (“In the United States, it has recently become clear that . . . conventions 
are essential to the operation of the U.S. constitutional regime, including the administrative 
state.”); Adrian Vermeule, Conventions of Agency Independence, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1163, 
1165 (2013) (“Constitutional theorists periodically (re)discover that the U.S. constitutional law 
is heavily based on conventions or unwritten political norms.”) [hereinafter Vermeule, 
Conventions of Agency Independence]. 
 5. For discussions of the distinction between the “small-c” and the “big-C” constitutions, 
see, for example, ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 3, at 1–28; Richard Primus, Unbundling 
Constitutionality, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1079, 1082–83 (2013); and Frederick Schauer, Amending 
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these writings generally treat the constitutional text as something 
analytically separate from whatever makes up the small-c 
constitution. 
This Article, by contrast, focuses on the construction of the text 
itself in American constitutional practice. Under some accounts of 
constitutional interpretation, the text plays a minor role. On this view, 
interpreters may invoke the text rhetorically, but it does not constrain 
their claims about the Constitution.6 These critical accounts can be 
contrasted with strictly textualist theories, which maintain that 
constitutional interpretation derives its authority from being firmly 
grounded in the written Constitution. Accordingly, textualists 
contend, the text must be—and often is—followed, at least when it is 
clear.7 
This Article contends that neither account accurately describes 
American interpretive practice. Textualists are correct in maintaining 
that, when the constitutional text is perceived to be clear,8 it operates 
as a meaningful constraint in interpretive practice—that is, it limits 
and shapes constitutional argumentation and thereby affects the 
available courses of action that will be considered constitutional. The 
perceived clarity of the text, however, is often partially constructed by 
that practice. More precisely, the perceived clarity of the text is not 
only a product of typical “plain meaning” considerations such as 
dictionary definitions and linguistic conventions. Rather, such 
perceived clarity can also be affected by a variety of other 
considerations, or “modalities,”9 that are commonly thought to come 
 
the Presuppositions of a Constitution, in RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY AND 
PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 145, 156–57 (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995). 
 6. See infra Part I.A. 
 7. There is no canonical definition of textualism, and textualists vary in the kinds of 
considerations that they are willing to consider in discerning the meaning of a text. By “strict 
textualist,” this Article refers to approaches that are open to considering only a narrow range of 
materials when discerning the “plain meaning” of the text. As discussed in Part III.B.2, some 
modern variants of textualism are receptive to a broader range of interpretive materials than 
were earlier variants. Such receptivity reduces the gap between textualism and the account 
provided here. But textualists are unlikely to acknowledge that all of the modalities discussed in 
this Article are part of an appropriate textual analysis. 
 8. More precisely, the text operates as a meaningful constraint when it is perceived to be 
(i) clear, (ii) applicable, and (iii) comprehensive in the sense that it says all there is to say about 
a constitutional question. For ease of exposition, this Article refers to clear, applicable, and 
comprehensive text simply as “clear.” 
 9. See infra Part II.A. 
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into play only in resolving ambiguities in the meaning of the text.10 
These modalities include reasoning about the purpose of a 
constitutional provision, structural inferences, understandings of the 
national ethos, consequentialist considerations, customary practice, 
and precedent.11 
After establishing this descriptive claim, the Article considers the 
implications of constructed constraint for theories of constitutional 
interpretation and change. Demonstrating that the clarity of the text 
is partially constructed by the full array of modalities of constitutional 
interpretation destabilizes the distinction between interpretation and 
construction, as well as other distinctions that theorists have drawn 
between the written and unwritten aspects of the Constitution. This 
Article also responds to potential objections to its account, including 
the objection that construction is simply the product of nontextual 
interpretive methodologies. Although methodological commitments 
might affect the nature and extent of construction in particular 
instances, this Article contends that the phenomenon is not reducible 
to particular methodological disputes. Even self-proclaimed 
textualists cannot help but engage in partially constructing the 
meaning of the constitutional text. 
This Article concludes by sketching a normative defense of 
constructed constraint. This phenomenon, the Article suggests, is an 
important way in which interpreters of all sorts (including judges, 
government officials, and social movements) work out in practice the 
constitutive tensions between a commitment to the rule of law and a 
 
 10. When this Article refers to “ambiguities” in the text, it does so in the loose way that the 
Supreme Court often does—that is, as a reference both to situations in which the applicability of 
the text to particular circumstances is unclear (what legal philosophers would term “vagueness”) 
and to situations in which the text could mean more than one specific thing (what legal 
philosophers would term “ambiguity”). See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-
Construction Distinction, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 95, 97–98 (2010). Though the distinction 
between vagueness and ambiguity is important in some contexts, this distinction is not material 
for the account of constructed constraint presented here. 
 11. By focusing generally on participants in American constitutional practice, this Article 
abstracts from the particular ways in which specific participants—including citizens, social 
movements, academics, politicians, and judges—interact with the text. There are potential 
differences among these groups. For example, social movements may, as a general matter, be 
more willing to “work on” the text than judges. Exploring those differences is beyond the 
purposes of this Article, which instead emphasizes the similarity that all actors, to some 
important extent, partially construct a constraining text. 
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commitment to the Constitution’s democratic responsiveness.12 
Relatedly, constructed constraint helps interpreters navigate a path 
between the “dead hand” problem (concerning the authority of 
constitutional provisions ratified long ago to bind current 
generations) and the countermajoritarian difficulty (concerning the 
legitimacy of having unelected judges override the choices of today’s 
majorities based on judicial interpretations of these provisions). In 
negotiating these tensions, the practice in turn helps to legitimate the 
ongoing project of constitutional democracy, both inside and outside 
the courts.13 
Part I begins by describing debates from the 1980s between 
critical theorists working in the area of constitutional law, who were 
skeptical about the constraining effect of the constitutional text, and 
other constitutional theorists who hypothesized that the text had a 
constraining effect, especially when it was perceived to be clear. Part I 
then describes two recent accounts of why the text might constrain—
the “focal point” theory and the “legal fidelity” theory—and argues 
that neither theory takes adequate account of how the clarity of the 
constitutional text is itself partly constructed. Part II identifies 
instances in which participants in American constitutional practice 
employ other modalities of constitutional interpretation to partially 
construct a constraining—or unconstraining—text. It uses a variety of 
case studies to illustrate the phenomenon of construction of textual 
ambiguity or clarity: the first word of the First Amendment, the 
extension of equal protection principles to action by the federal 
government, state sovereign immunity, President Lincoln’s 
suspension of habeas corpus, the creation of West Virginia, and 
presidential authority to make recess appointments. 
Part III considers the implications of constructed constraint for 
constitutional theory and anticipates several potential criticisms of 
this account: that it is nonfalsifiable, that it reduces to disputes over 
methodology, and that it is all construction and no constraint. Part III 
also offers some preliminary generalizations about the difficult 
question of when construction, as opposed to constraint, is more or 
less likely to occur. Finally, this Part suggests some ways that the 
 
 12. For a discussion of these tensions, see Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Democratic 
Constitutionalism, in THE CONSTITUTION IN 2020, at 25, 25–33 (Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. 
Siegel eds., 2009). 
 13. See infra Part III.D. 
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practice of constructed constraint produces normative benefits for the 
constitutional system as a whole.14 
I.  FROM WHETHER TO WHY THE TEXT MATTERS 
This Part begins by describing scholarly debates in the 1980s, 
involving (among many other things) skepticism by certain members 
of the Critical Legal Studies (CLS) movement about whether 
constitutional interpreters feel constrained by the constitutional text. 
The CLS perspective appears to have receded since those debates, 
such that the focus today is less on whether interpreters feel 
constrained by the text and more on why they regard the text as 
binding. To illustrate this shift in the terms of the debate, this Part 
next considers two recent accounts of the role of the text—one by 
David Strauss and the other by Jack Balkin—both of which assume 
that clear text is experienced as a constraint, but which offer 
divergent explanations of why it constrains. As will be explained, both 
of these theories are rich and illuminating, but neither takes sufficient 
account of a core insight of the earlier CLS theorists—that a variety 
of extratextual considerations are likely to affect the perception of 
whether the constitutional text is clear. Because of this aspect of 
interpretive practice, the constraining effect of the text is itself partly 
constructed. One can appreciate this insight without concluding, as 
certain CLS theorists in the field of constitutional law appeared to 
believe, that there are no textually understood constraints on 
constitutional practice. (One can also appreciate this insight without 
necessarily endorsing the left-wing political ideology with which the 
CLS movement became associated.) As subsequent parts will show, 
 
 14. The phenomenon of constructed constraint also arises in statutory interpretation. 
Although this Article touches on statutory interpretation in a few places, its focus is on the role 
of the constitutional text. Several considerations warrant such a focus, including the age of the 
Constitution, the difficulty of amending it, the dead hand problems raised by these facts, the 
countermajoritarian issues raised by judicial review, and the general “nature” of a written 
constitution (as opposed to a statute). See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 
(1819) (“[W]e must never forget, that it is a constitution we are expounding.”). For a recent 
example of a statutory interpretation decision in which the Court relied on extratextual 
considerations in determining that the text was unclear, see Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 
2077, 2090 (2014) (“In this case, the ambiguity derives from the improbably broad reach of the 
key statutory definition given the term—‘chemical weapon’—being defined; the deeply serious 
consequences of adopting such a boundless reading; and the lack of any apparent need to do so 
in light of the context from which the statute arose—a treaty about chemical warfare and 
terrorism.”). 
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even if constraint itself is ultimately constructed, there are meaningful 
differences in degree among different kinds of construction. 
A. 1980s Debates About Whether the Text Matters 
In the 1980s, there was an active and anxious debate about the 
role of the text in constitutional interpretation. This debate took 
place against the backdrop of the CLS movement, which (like the 
legal realist movement of an earlier generation, from whose insights it 
drew) was broadly skeptical of formalism in the law, including claims 
about the determinacy of legal texts.15 The CLS movement was in turn 
influenced by the growing interest in textual interpretation during the 
1970s in the areas of anthropology, philosophy, and literary theory, 
especially “hermeneutical” insights into the conditions that make 
interpretation possible.16 Of particular significance to CLS scholars 
(and to some of their critics) was Hans-Georg Gadamer’s theory that 
all interpretation unavoidably involves a conversation between an 
interpreter and a text, so that any act of interpretation causes the text 
to merge with the objectives and perspectives of the interpreter.17 
An early entrant into the 1980s debate about the constitutional 
text was the critical legal scholar Paul Brest. In an influential article, 
Brest coined the term “originalism” to refer to “the familiar approach 
to constitutional adjudication that accords binding authority to the 
text of the Constitution or the intentions of its adopters.”18 Brest 
critiqued that approach in part by noting that it could not explain 
 
 15. For an introduction to the elements of CLS theory, see generally MARK KELMAN, A 
GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES (1987); see also Mark Tushnet, Critical Legal Studies: A 
Political History, 100 YALE L.J. 1515, 1516–37 (1991) (exploring the political aspects of, and 
political influences on, the CLS movement).   
 16. See LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM 101–31 (1996) 
(documenting various influences on the CLS movement). 
 17. See generally HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD (1975). Looking back in 
2000, Robin West wrote that “Hans-Georg Gadamer directly or indirectly set much of the 
agenda for the entire founding generation of critical legal scholars.” Robin West, Are There 
Nothing but Texts in this Class? Interpreting the Interpretive Turns in Legal Thought, 76 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 1125, 1125 (2000). Other important influences include the writings of the 
American literary theorist Stanley Fish and leading European “deconstructionist” philosophers 
such as Jacques Derrida. 
 18. Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 
204, 204 (1980). Brest targeted first-generation originalism, which tended to focus on the 
original intent of the Framers of the Constitution. By contrast, second-generation originalism, 
which prevails today, tends to focus on the original semantic meaning of the text of the 
Constitution. For an overview of the reasons behind and players responsible for this change in 
emphasis over time, see Keith E. Whittington, Originalism: A Critical Introduction, 82 
FORDHAM L. REV. 375, 378–82 (2013).  
BRADLEY SIEGEL IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 4/1/2015  5:38 PM 
2015] CONSTRUCTED CONSTRAINT 1221 
much of modern constitutional law. “[I]f you consider the evolution 
of doctrines in just about any extensively-adjudicated area of 
constitutional law,” Brest memorably opined, “originalist sources 
[have] played a very small role compared to the elaboration of the 
Court’s own precedents. It is rather like having a remote ancestor 
who came over on the Mayflower.”19 
More fundamentally, Brest criticized originalism by invoking “a 
hermeneutic tradition, of which Hans-Georg Gadamar is the leading 
modern proponent.”20 This tradition, Brest explained, “holds that we 
can never understand the past in its own terms, free from our 
prejudices or preconceptions.”21 Given this hermeneutic insight, Brest 
suggested, one ought to “appreciate the indeterminate and contingent 
nature of the historical understanding that an originalist historian 
seeks to achieve.”22 
Having rejected originalism, Brest argued instead for a non-
originalist approach, which would “accord the text and original 
history presumptive weight, but [would] not treat them as 
authoritative or binding.”23 Brest offered as the “touchstone[] of 
constitutional decisionmaking” this “designedly vague criterion: How 
well, compared to possible alternatives, does the practice contribute 
to the well-being of our society—or, more narrowly, to the ends of 
constitutional government?”24 That formulation was entirely 
unsatisfactory—and anxiety provoking—to traditional academic 
constitutional lawyers who, in the tradition of Herbert Wechsler,25 
Gerald Gunther,26 and John Hart Ely,27 sought to defend the idea that 
law was separable from politics.28 
Like Brest, Mark Tushnet was critical of both originalism and 
textualism. Tushnet combined his critiques with skepticism about the 
perceived constraining effect of the constitutional text. In a 1983 
 
 19. Brest, supra note 18, at 234. 
 20. Id. at 221. 
 21. Id. at 221–22. 
 22. Id. at 222. 
 23. Id. at 205. 
 24. Id. at 226. 
 25. See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. 
REV. 1, 15 (1959). 
 26. See Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the “Passive Virtues”—A Comment on 
Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3–5 (1964). 
 27. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 
54–55 (1980). 
 28. See KALMAN, supra note 16, at 108–10 (noting critical responses to Brest). 
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article, he provocatively wrote that “in any interesting case any 
reasonably skilled lawyer can reach whatever result he or she 
wants.”29 Noting that “[t]he significance of the claim . . . turns on the 
definition of ‘interesting,’” he asserted that “the claim holds even if 
an ‘interesting’ case is defined as one that some lawyer finds 
worthwhile to pursue.”30 Tushnet expanded on this idea two years 
later in a critique of textualism in constitutional law. Writing in a 
symposium on interpretation, he argued that even purportedly clear 
constitutional provisions, like the minimum age requirement and the 
two-term limit for presidents, could be rendered contestable by resort 
to purposive construction or other textual provisions.31 
Because there was no canonical CLS perspective, and because 
many CLS scholars did not focus on the constitutional text, it is 
unclear whether and to what extent Tushnet’s claim about the lack of 
textually perceived constraint was shared by others. In any event, the 
claim was criticized by non-CLS scholars. Fred Schauer argued, for 
example, that there were in fact “easy cases” in constitutional law, in 
part because of the linguistic clarity of the relevant constitutional 
text.32 “[L]anguage can and frequently does speak with a sufficiently 
clear voice,” Schauer said, “such that linguistically articulated norms 
themselves leave little doubt as to which results are consistent with 
that command.”33 As for Tushnet’s contention that any perceived 
textual clarity can disappear given the right set of facts, Schauer 
suggested that this “argument from weird cases” did not rebut his 
claim about easy cases.34 That it may be “impossible to have an 
entirely clear constitutional clause,” Schauer wrote, “does not mean 
that there are no core cases in which an argument on one side would 
be almost universally agreed to be compelling, and an argument on 
 
 29. Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and 
Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781, 819 (1983).   
 30. Id. at 819 n.119. 
 31. Mark V. Tushnet, A Note on the Revival of Textualism in Constitutional Theory, 58 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 683, 686–88 (1985); see also Gary Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 
CALIF. L. REV. 1151, 1174 (1985) (“It is possible the age thirty-five signified to the Framers a 
certain level of maturity rather than some intrinsically significant number of years. If so, it is 
open to argument whether the translation in our social universe of the clause still means thirty-
five years of age.”). 
 32. See Frederick Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 399, 404 (1985). 
 33. Id. at 416. 
 34. Id. at 420. 
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the other side would be almost universally agreed to be specious.”35 
Tushnet responded by contending that when the political context 
changes, “the linguistic constraints on which Schauer relies disappear 
as well.”36 Cases are “weird,” Tushnet claimed, only “until someone 
finds it worthwhile to pursue them.”37 
The extent to which there was a genuine disagreement between 
Tushnet and Schauer turns in part on how broadly one reads their 
respective claims. Sanford Levinson, like Tushnet, denied “that any 
legal text, including the United States Constitution, can be viewed as 
a meaningful constraint on an adjudicator’s decision.”38 But Levinson 
also cautioned against overreading Tushnet. “The brunt of Mark 
Tushnet’s remarks,” Levinson wrote, “is . . . that anything can be 
called into question, given the right political circumstances, including 
the presumably ‘clear’ requirement of the Constitution that every 
state have two Senators,” and he was unsure “whether Schauer 
genuinely disagrees.”39 “As I understand him,” Levinson continued, 
“Tushnet does not argue that every single legal term is up for grabs at 
every moment, only that every term is potentially up for grabs should 
a clever lawyer, backed by a powerful client, find it useful in a given 
situation.”40 As an example, Levinson argued that “even if the 
fourteenth amendment were not in the Constitution we could be 
confident that lawyers (and judges) would seize on allegedly more 
precise patches of text to achieve ends now served by reliance on it.”41 
By contrast, the liberal political theorist Don Herzog critically 
described Tushnet as embracing “a freewheeling skepticism, a view in 
which any text can mean anything we want it to.”42 Herzog rejected 
 
 35. Id. at 422; see also Richard A. Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the 
Interpretation of Statutes and the Constitution, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 179, 191 (1986) (“No 
text is clear except in terms of a linguistic and cultural environment, but it doesn’t follow that no 
text is clear. The relevant environment, and its bearing on the specific interpretive question, 
may be clear.”). 
 36. Tushnet, supra note 31, at 688 n.24. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Sanford Levinson, What Do Lawyers Know (And What Do They Do with Their 
Knowledge)? Comments on Schauer and Moore, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 441, 441–42 (1985) 
[hereinafter Levinson, What Do Lawyers Know?]; see also Sanford Levinson, Law as Literature, 
60 TEX. L. REV. 373, 400–01 (1982).  
 39. Levinson, What Do Lawyers Know?, supra note 38, at 450–51.    
 40. Id. at 451.  
 41. Id. at 451–52. 
 42. Don Herzog, As Many as Six Impossible Things Before Breakfast, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 
609, 629 (1987).  
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what he regarded as Tushnet’s apparent embrace of nihilism, even as 
characterized by Levinson. “It is not all that consoling,” he wrote, “to 
think that things are up for grabs only when someone wants them to 
be.”43 Herzog rejected the “stark binary choice” posed by certain CLS 
writers whereby “either rules times facts equals decisions, or it is all 
up for grabs.”44 
Also recoiling at assertions of interpretive indeterminacy were 
scholars within the legal academy who sought to defend an active role 
for the judiciary in improving American society. A prominent 
example was Owen Fiss, who decried “a new nihilism”45 and 
contended that the hermeneutic insights of other disciplines actually 
favored his traditionally liberal position. In his insistence that 
“[a]djudication is interpretation” and that “[i]nterpretation, whether 
it be in the law or literary domains, is neither a wholly discretionary 
nor a wholly mechanical activity,”46 one can see the influence of 
hermeneutic insights on his thinking: 
Viewing adjudication as interpretation helps to stop the slide 
towards nihilism. It makes law possible. We can find in this 
conceptualization a recognition of both the subjective and the 
objective—the important personal role played by the interpreter in 
the meaning-giving process, and yet the possibility of an inter-
subjective meaning rooted in the idea of disciplining rules and of an 
interpretive community that both legitimates those rules and is 
defined by them.47 
For Fiss, the impossibility of sealing off the reader from the text did 
not drown the law in indeterminacy. On the contrary, it held the 
power to save the law from the nihilism of an increasing number of 
legal scholars. 
A few years later, Fiss would characterize the CLS movement 
“as a reaction to a jurisprudence, confidently embraced by the bar in 
the sixties, that sees adjudication as the process for interpreting and 
nurturing a public morality.”48 He indicted CLS scholars for rejecting 
“the notion of law as public ideal” and for instead proclaiming that 
 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. See Owen M. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739, 740 (1982). 
 46. Id. at 739. 
 47. Id. at 750. 
 48. Owen M. Fiss, The Death of the Law?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 2 (1986).    
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“‘law is politics.’”49 Their basic problem, Fiss insisted, lay in refusing 
“to take law on its own terms, and to accept adjudication as an 
institutional arrangement in which public officials seek to elaborate 
and protect the values that we hold in common.”50 Fiss saw a critical 
difference between CLS writers and both the feminists of his day and 
the legal realists of an earlier day: “Critical legal studies scholars want 
to unmask the law, but not to make law into an effective instrument 
of good public policy or equality. The aim of their critique is 
critique.”51 
The 1980s debates about the role of the constitutional text 
eventually receded, as did the CLS movement more generally—
although specialized offshoots of the movement persist, such as in the 
areas of feminist legal theory and critical race theory.52 Today, most 
theorizing about the constitutional text assumes that interpreters 
experience some level of constraint, at least for those aspects of the 
text that are regarded as clear. The next Section considers two recent 
theories that attempt to explain why participants in the practice of 
constitutional interpretation view clear constitutional text as binding. 
B. Two Recent Accounts of Why the Text Matters 
Today there are two primary accounts of why the constitutional 
text plays an important role in American interpretive practice: David 
Strauss’s focal point theory and Jack Balkin’s legal fidelity theory. 
Both of these accounts reject the critical perspective and accept that 
clear text is constraining, but they differ about why clear text has this 
effect. Importantly for present purposes, neither account focuses on 
the extent to which the perceived clarity of the text is itself 
 
 49. Id.  
 50. Id.  
 51. Id. at 10. The legal philosopher Ronald Dworkin had a complex relationship to CLS 
during the 1980s. On the one hand, Dworkin’s understanding of “constructive” interpretation as 
“essentially concerned with . . . the purposes . . . of the interpreter,” RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S 
EMPIRE 52 (1986), seems compatible with CLS claims about the subjectivity of judicial 
decisionmaking. On the other hand, CLS scholars were hostile to Dworkin’s thesis that “in most 
hard cases there are right answers to be hunted by reason and imagination.” Id. at viii–ix. He in 
return criticized those CLS scholars who “may want to show law in its worst rather than its best 
light, to show avenues closed that are in fact open, to move toward a new mystification in 
service of undisclosed political goals.” Id. at 275. This criticism was similar to Fiss’s charge that 
“[t]he aim of their critique is critique.” Fiss, supra note 48, at 10. 
 52. The current prominence of ideological explanations of Supreme Court decisionmaking 
is also consistent with certain CLS claims. See generally, e.g., JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. 
SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002).  
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constructed. This Section describes and identifies some of the 
limitations of these accounts. 
1. Focal Point Theory.  David Strauss’s book, The Living 
Constitution, provides a good explanation of the focal point theory of 
the importance of the constitutional text. In arguing for “common law 
constitutionalism,” Strauss recognizes that constitutional interpreters 
must not purport to contradict the text of the Constitution.53 Strauss 
accounts for the exalted status of the text by offering a “common 
ground justification.”54 His explanation is that the text performs a 
settlement function. It is sometimes “more important that things be 
settled than that they be settled right, and the provisions of the 
written Constitution settle things.”55 In Strauss’s view, the text is 
treated as binding because of “the practical judgment that following 
this text, despite its shortcomings, is on balance a good thing to do 
because it resolves issues that have to be resolved one way or the 
other.”56 
Under Strauss’s focal point account, “by and large, the text 
matters most for the least important questions.”57 For example, in 
commenting on the Supreme Court’s decisions concerning the 
separation of powers, Strauss observes that the Court has relied on 
the text for technical issues, but has “acted more like a common law 
court” in more significant cases.58 “When the stakes are high,” Strauss 
claims, the settlement function of the text is less significant because 
“it is more important to settle the matter right.”59 
Notwithstanding his view that the text matters most when the 
issue matters least, Strauss stresses the awareness of participants in 
the constitutional practice that if the text became less sacrosanct, it 
would no longer serve as common ground, and all manner of settled 
 
 53. See STRAUSS, supra note 2, at 103 (describing as “one of the absolute fixed points of 
our legal culture” that “[w]e cannot say that the text of the Constitution doesn’t matter”). For 
earlier expressions of his views, see generally David A. Strauss, Common Law, Common 
Ground, and Jefferson’s Principle, 112 YALE L.J. 1717 (2003); David A. Strauss, Common Law 
Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877 (1996) [hereinafter Strauss, Common Law].   
 54. See STRAUSS, supra note 2, at 111. 
 55. Id. at 102.  
 56. Id. at 105. 
 57. Id. at 110. 
 58. Id.  
 59. Id. at 111. Cf. Karl N. Llewellyn, The Constitution as an Institution, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 
1, 39 (1934) (“Where it makes no important difference which way the decision goes, the Text—in 
the absence of countervailing practice—is an excellent traffic light.”).   
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questions would be up for grabs. “We do not ‘overrule’ the text,” 
Strauss explains, “because any such overruling would jeopardize the 
ability of the text to serve as a generally accepted focal point.”60 
Otherwise, disputes could “spin out of control and create serious 
social divisions.”61 
There is undoubtedly some truth to the idea that constitutional 
text serves as a focal point. Indeed, the public has access to much of 
the text in a way that it does not for many other legal materials, such 
as the more than 550 volumes of Supreme Court precedent.62 Even so, 
this account seems incomplete in several respects. As an initial 
matter, there is tension between Strauss’s claim that text generally 
matters only for the least important issues and his claim that 
participants in the constitutional system recognize that it would be 
problematic for the stability of the system to allow deviations. If the 
issue is unimportant, it is difficult to see how questioning it would 
produce serious social division or would lead to an unraveling of 
understandings on more important issues.63 Furthermore, contrary to 
his claim that the text is relied upon as a constraint primarily for 
matters of low importance, the Supreme Court at times has invoked 
the text to invalidate major innovations in the distribution of 
authority between Congress and the president, such as the legislative 
veto in INS v. Chadha64 and the line item veto in Clinton v. City of 
New York.65 
Moreover, Strauss’s account does not seem to sufficiently 
distinguish the status of the text from that of certain other forms of 
constitutional authority. Judicial precedents, for example, may serve a 
 
 60. Strauss, Common Law, supra note 53, at 911; see also Larry Alexander & Frederick 
Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1376 (1997) 
(“Without a written constitution as a stabilizing force, there is a risk that too many issues 
needing at least intermediate term settlement will remain excessively uncertain.”). 
 61. STRAUSS, supra note 2, at 105. 
 62. Cf. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819) (“A constitution, to 
contain an accurate detail of all the subdivisions of which its great powers will admit, and of all 
the means by which they may be carried into execution, would partake of the prolixity of a legal 
code, and could scarcely be embraced by the human mind. It would probably never be 
understood by the public.”). On the other hand, the proverbial person in the street may know 
more about the rights protected in Brown, Miranda, and Roe than she does about much of the 
constitutional text. 
 63. Cf. Akhil Reed Amar, American Constitutionalism—Written, Unwritten, and Living, 
126 HARV. L. REV. F. 195, 198, 201 (2013) (noting tension between Strauss’s focal point account 
and his view of the minor role of the text). 
 64. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
 65. Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998). 
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focal point or settlement function that is similar to the function 
Strauss attributes to the text. Revisiting precedents that have long 
been deemed settled, like disregarding the text, “takes time and 
energy” and “can spin out of control and create serious social 
divisions.”66 Indeed, given Strauss’s belief that most of the important 
aspects of modern constitutional law are not based on the text, the 
danger of unsettling the law would seem to be greater from 
questioning precedent than from questioning the text. The same can 
potentially be said of unwritten “constitutional conventions,” which, 
like text and precedent, can serve as an important focal point.67 
In Strauss’s defense, the text may be a better focal point than 
judicial precedent, at least as a general matter. This is because the 
text is much harder to amend—and participants know this. To amend 
precedent, one must (at most) change the Court’s composition in a 
decisive and desired way. (This assumes, as seems accurate, that stare 
decisis is relatively weak in constitutional cases.) By contrast, textual 
amendments must run the Article V gauntlet. Over the course of 
American history, there have been many more changes in 
constitutional law through partisan entrenchment than through 
constitutional amendment.68 
Even if the text is generally a better focal point than precedent, 
however, a focal point approach does not seem sufficient to 
distinguish the status of the two. No matter how much of a focal point 
function certain precedents perform, most constitutional interpreters 
deem it permissible, at least in principle, for the Court to revisit 
almost all of them (and for other interpreters to urge the Court to 
revisit them). By contrast, no portion of constitutional text is so 
regarded despite whatever focal point function it performs.69 Rather, 
an amendment is deemed necessary to overcome text that is 
perceived to be clear. If the text were only a focal point, then it would 
be entitled only to presumptive weight (as the CLS scholar Paul Brest 
 
 66. STRAUSS, supra note 2, at 105. 
 67. See Vermeule, Conventions of Agency Independence, supra note 4, at 1192. 
 68. See generally Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Processes of Constitutional 
Change: From Partisan Entrenchment to the National Surveillance State, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 
489 (2006) (discussing these changes); Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the 
Constitutional Revolution, 87 VA. L. REV. 1045 (2001) (same). Between 1789 and 2004, the 
Supreme Court overruled 208 constitutional precedents in 133 cases. See MICHAEL J. 
GERHARDT, THE POWER OF PRECEDENT 9 (2008). 
 69. See Schauer, supra note 32, at 437 (noting that “precedents can be discarded if 
necessary in a way that textual language cannot”). 
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had argued70), and deviations from the text would be permissible if 
the stakes were high enough. Yet, as Strauss himself acknowledges, 
“one of the absolute fixed points of our legal culture is that we cannot 
do that.”71 The reasons why the constitutional text is such a fixed 
point in the United States are difficult to determine, and any 
explanation would presumably need to engage with historical and 
sociological aspects of American constitutionalism. The key point for 
present purposes is that the text operates differently in American 
interpretive practice than does precedent. 
A focal point explanation of the role of the constitutional text 
would also require a more detailed account than Strauss offers of the 
incentives of various interpreters to maintain the text as a focal point. 
Such an account, to be persuasive, would need to include an 
explanation of how participants overcome obvious collective action 
problems, both at a particular time and over time.72 It may be that, 
contra Strauss, participants in the practice overcome collective action 
problems not simply for self-interested reasons, but also through a 
process of norm internalization that emphasizes the constraining 
quality of constitutional text that is deemed clear.73 
In sum, no matter what the stakes, it is not an acceptable move in 
American constitutional discourse to argue that the constitutional 
text may lawfully be disregarded,74 whereas it is an acceptable move 
 
 70. See supra text accompanying note 23 (quoting Brest, supra note 18, at 205). 
 71. STRAUSS, supra note 2, at 103; see also Steven G. Calabresi, The Tradition of the 
Written Constitution: A Comment on Professor Lessig’s Theory of Translation, 65 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 1435, 1446 (1997) (describing “a deep-seated cultural commitment to written 
constitutionalism in this country”); Michael C. Dorf, The Undead Constitution, 125 HARV. L. 
REV. 2011, 2016 (2012) (reviewing BALKIN, supra note 2, and STRAUSS, supra note 2) (“[T]he 
focal-point account of the Constitution does not fully capture the role the Constitution plays in 
American life.”); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Constitutional Constraints, 97 CAL. L. REV. 975, 994 
(2009) (“Explanations of constitutional law as just a system of equilibria involving purely self-
interested actors cannot account adequately for the law’s insistent claims to normative 
authority.”). 
 72. Collective action problems are ones in which individually rational conduct leads to 
collectively irrational results. See Robert D. Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Collective Action 
Federalism: A General Theory of Article I, Section 8, 63 STAN. L. REV. 115, 117, 135–44 (2010). 
 73. For discussions of the relationship between law and norm internalization, see generally, 
for example, TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (2006), and Robert Cooter, Do 
Good Laws Make Good Citizens? An Economic Analysis of Internalized Norms, 86 VA. L. REV. 
1577 (2000). 
 74. There have been occasional suggestions that necessity trumps the Constitution, 
particularly by interpreters with a relatively narrow view of the scope of federal power. See, e.g., 
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to J.B. Colvin (Sept. 20, 1810), in 12 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS 
JEFFERSON 418 (Andrew A. Lipscomb ed., 1904) (“A strict observance of the written laws is 
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to argue that a judicial precedent (or nonjudicial precedent) should 
be overturned, even if it is well settled.75 A common law approach 
seems unable to make sufficient sense of the special importance of 
the text in constitutional practice. The text is more than a common 
ground or convenience, and certain parts of it are not subject to 
change via common law methods. The text, when it is deemed clear, is 
characteristically regarded as binding law that may legitimately be 
changed only through a formal amendment. The socialization of 
lawyers and the public, as well as elite audience costs, seem to 
disallow open disregard of the constitutional text to a degree that 
seems distinct from other constitutional materials.76 
Constitutional text seems special in other ways as well. For 
example, one feature of the role of the text in interpretive practice is 
that, as Michael Dorf has noted, it tends to crowd out freestanding 
claims of constitutional custom.77 This is not an inevitable effect of 
having a legal text. Under international law, custom is a freestanding 
 
doubtless one of the high duties of a good citizen, but it is not the highest. The laws of necessity, 
of self-preservation, of saving our country when in danger, are of higher obligation.”). But such 
claims are rare. The effect of exigency on perceptions about whether the constitutional text is 
clear or ambiguous is explored in Part II.D. 
 75. One might object that the constitutional text is sometimes disregarded, as a practical 
matter, through judicial nonenforcement or underenforcement. For example, the Supreme 
Court has long held that Article IV, Section 4’s guarantee to each state of a republican form of 
government presents a political question and so may not be enforced by the judiciary. See, e.g., 
Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849). There is a difference, however, between judicial 
unwillingness to enforce the text because of perceived limits on judicial authority or capacity 
and affirmative endorsement of government action perceived to be contrary to the text. When 
the Court declines to enforce the text, it is not claiming that the text may lawfully be 
disregarded. 
 76. Cf. Daryl J. Levinson, Parchment and Politics: The Positive Puzzle of Constitutional 
Commitment, 124 HARV. L. REV. 657, 708 (2011) (“[I]t is an indisputable feature of 
constitutional practice that the text is taken to be authoritative within its domain. That domain 
is limited, but significant.”); id. at 709 (“More broadly, our commitment to the text creates a 
discursive requirement that all constitutional norms and arguments be couched as 
‘interpretations’ of the big-C Constitution.”); Henry P. Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 384 (1981) (“For the purposes of legal reasoning, the binding quality of the 
constitutional text is itself incapable of and not in need of further demonstration. It is our 
master rule of recognition, one initially so intended and understood and one which our 
‘tradition’ in fact continues to perpetuate.”). 
 77. See Michael C. Dorf, How the Written Constitution Crowds Out the Extraconstitutional 
Rule of Recognition, in THE RULE OF RECOGNITION AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 69 
(Matthew D. Adler & Kenneth Einar Himma eds., 2009). It is possible, however, that certain 
customary practices assume constitutional status as claims on the constitutional structure, which 
are asserted to supplement the text. For discussions of structural reasoning, see CHARLES L. 
BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1969), and PHILIP 
BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION ch. 6 (1982). 
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source of law that can operate not only in conjunction with written 
treaty text, but even in opposition to it. For example, in the 2013 
debate over possible military intervention in Syria, the British 
government claimed that the general ban on the use of force in the 
U.N. Charter had been modified (or was in the process of being 
modified) by a narrow customary exception for humanitarian 
intervention.78 By contrast, a claim of customary override of the text is 
almost never made in U.S. constitutional discourse.79 
In fact, even freestanding customary claims that do not 
contradict the text are unusual in the discourse. To take one example, 
the text of the Constitution is silent about whether the president may 
unilaterally terminate treaties (which require two-thirds senatorial 
consent in order to be ratified).80 Substantial modern customary 
practice supports such unilateral presidential authority, and the 
Executive Branch unsurprisingly refers to it—but it does so as a 
purported “gloss” on the phrase “executive Power” in Article II,81 not 
as a freestanding claim of customary constitutional law.82 Strauss may 
miss some of these interpretive practices because his common law 
constitutional theory focuses on the courts, even as he makes passing 
reference to nonjudicial precedent. It seems likely, however, that the 
text can affect both what gets brought to the courts and how 
constitutional law develops outside the courts.83 
Finally, the special nature of the constitutional text is implicitly 
reflected in certain debates in constitutional theory about 
constitutional change—for example, responses to Bruce Ackerman’s 
influential theory of “constitutional moments” as valid non–Article V 
 
 78. See Chemical Weapon Use by Syrian Regime—UK Government Legal Position (Aug. 
29, 2013), http://i2.cdn.turner.com/cnn/2013/images/08/29/chemical-weapon-use-by-syrian-
regime-uk-government-legal-position.pdf. 
 79. See, e.g., AMAR, supra note 1, at xii (“[T]he written Constitution itself operates on a 
higher legal plane, and a clear constitutional command may not as a rule be trumped by a mere 
case, statute, or custom.”). 
 80. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. 
 81. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. 
 82. See Andrzej Rapaczynski, The Ninth Amendment and the Unwritten Constitution: The 
Problems of Constitutional Interpretation, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 177, 192 (1988) (“[J]udges 
sometimes admit that constitutional interpretation is sensitive to historical evolution and that 
history adds a ‘gloss’ on the text. But they never admit to deriving the authority for their 
decisions from outside the constitutional text . . . .”); see generally Curtis A. Bradley, Treaty 
Termination and Historical Gloss, 92 TEX. L. REV. 773, 815–16 (2014). 
 83. Cf. Schauer, supra note 32, at 408–14 (looking beyond litigation for “easy cases” by 
noting, among other things, the many matters that are never pursued beyond the lawyer’s 
office). 
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amendments.84 Critics of Ackerman’s theory tend to be more 
comfortable with the idea of changing interpretations of an 
unchanging constitutional text (until properly amended via Article V) 
than they are with the idea of unwritten amendments to the text, even 
though the practical effect of the two may be similar.85 This response 
appears to reflect a belief that, even if malleable, the constitutional 
text operates as a constraint on politics and that it will lose this 
characteristic if it can be amended informally. 
2. Legal Fidelity Theory.  Jack Balkin’s book Living Originalism 
provides a different account of the constraining nature of the 
constitutional text. In arguing for “framework originalism,” Balkin 
contends that the Constitution provides “an initial framework for 
governance that sets politics in motion.”86 Framework originalism is a 
mostly underdeterminate decisional approach. It requires fidelity to, 
and only to, the framework—to the original semantic meaning of “the 
rules, standards, and principles stated by the Constitution’s text.”87 
Balkin distinguishes his theory from “skyscraper originalism,”88 which 
is what most people imagine when they imagine originalism. 
Skyscraper originalists make much greater demands on the present by 
requiring fidelity to original intentions, purposes, or expected 
applications, even when they purport to care only about semantic 
meaning.89 
In Balkin’s view, regarding oneself as bound by more than the 
framework renders one unable to explain the American constitutional 
tradition, including its greatest achievements. On the other hand, 
regarding oneself as bound by less than the framework leads to the 
difficulty presented by Strauss’s account of common law 
 
 84. See generally BRUCE ACKERMAN, 1 WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991); BRUCE 
ACKERMAN, 2 WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998); BRUCE ACKERMAN, 3 WE THE 
PEOPLE: THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION (2014). 
 85. See generally, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, The Forgotten Constitutional Moment, 11 
CONST. COMMENT. 115 (1994); Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: 
Reflections on Free-Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221 
(1995). 
 86. BALKIN, supra note 2, at 3. 
 87. Id. at 3; see also id. at 45.  
 88. Id. at 21–23.  
 89. See id. at 104 (“[T]oday’s original meaning originalists often view original expected 
applications as very strong evidence of original meaning . . . . Hence, even though conservative 
originalists may distinguish between the ideas of original meaning and original expected 
applications in theory, they often conflate them in practice.”).  
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constitutionalism: viewing the text as a mere focal point does not 
explain its special role. As Balkin notes, “Once we recognize that 
precedents are focal points too, the focal-points theory does not really 
explain why courts cannot change the hard-wired rules of the 
Constitution through common law adjudication.”90 Of course, a court 
may be concerned that an open disregard of the text would place 
greater strain on its legitimacy. As Balkin points out, however, “this 
simply raises the deeper question of why the public and politicians 
alike assume that we should not be able to change the constitutional 
text by common law methods of judicial decision.”91 
Compared with Strauss’s living constitutionalism, Balkin’s 
framework originalism makes better sense of widely shared 
convictions about the constitutional text—namely, that like properly 
enacted statutes of long duration, it is binding law, so that one is not 
free to ignore it when it is regarded as clear.92 Contrary to some CLS 
claims in the 1980s,93 almost no one would be persuaded by a 
“purposive” (re)construction of the various clauses imposing age 
qualifications for federal offices—for example, a claim that someone 
under the age of thirty-five could be elected president as long as he or 
she had a certain level of maturity, or a claim that the age 
requirement is actually higher than thirty-five because, with 
increasing longevity, people tend to mature more slowly today. Of 
course, the text itself does not logically preclude such an argument—
the text itself is just marks on a page.94 Rather, the argument is 
unpersuasive because of a complicated and somewhat mysterious set 
of norms and assumptions that seem largely taken for granted in the 
American interpretive practice, such as the rule-oriented function of 
numbers in legal texts and the perceived desirability of having a 
 
 90. Id. at 53. 
 91. Id. at 53–54. 
 92. See Frederick Schauer, An Essay on Constitutional Language, 29 UCLA L. REV. 797, 
810 (1982) (“A theory of constitutional language is incomplete if it does not recognize the way 
in which a text is authoritative—the way in which we treat the Constitution, but not, for 
example, the Declaration of Independence or the Mayflower Compact, as law.”); see also Neil S. 
Siegel, Jack Balkin’s Rich Historicism and Diet Originalism: Health Benefits and Risks for the 
Constitutional System, 111 MICH. L. REV. 931, 947 (2013) (arguing that Balkin better accounts 
for these widely shared convictions about the text than does Strauss). 
 93. See supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
 94. Cf. Frank H. Easterbook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 536 (1983) (“The 
philosophy of language, and most particularly the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein, has established 
that sets of words do not possess intrinsic meanings and cannot be given them . . . .”) (citing 
LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS §§ 138–242 (1953)). 
BRADLEY SIEGEL IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 4/1/2015  5:38 PM 
1234 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 64:1213 
bright-line approach to issues like candidate qualifications. It may be 
possible to imagine highly unusual circumstances in which those 
norms and assumptions could be altered, but they would not change 
merely because “some lawyer finds [it] worthwhile to pursue” a 
different course of action.95 (The conditions under which construction 
of the text is more or less likely are explored further in Part III.C.) 
Similarly, as much as scholars like Sanford Levinson lament 
various structural features of the Constitution, they do not argue that 
we are free to ignore them—to abolish via statute, say, the Electoral 
College, the equal representation of the states in the Senate, or the 
president’s veto power. On the contrary, Levinson’s concerns spring 
from the recognition that, because the text is regarded as clear on 
these matters, he cannot responsibly advocate that ignoring clear text 
is consistent with legality.96 (Whether this recognition is consistent 
with Levinson’s claims about textual indeterminacy during the 1980s 
is another question.97) Similarly, conservatives who complain about 
certain features of the constitutional text, such as the Seventeenth 
Amendment, assume that their only option is to persuade enough 
other Americans to amend the text formally.98 
In accord with Balkin’s account, the reason these issues are not 
revisited is that the text is understood to settle them. The reason is 
not, as Strauss’s account suggests, that they are viewed as 
unimportant or that there is a tacit understanding that revisiting them 
would be harmful to the constitutional system. The text seems to 
matter even when the issues matter. 
But Balkin’s account, too, has its limitations. The special role of 
the text in interpretive practice requires more of an explanation than 
the claim that “the text continues in force today because it is law.”99 
As Strauss notes, there are different conceptions of law, and although 
an authoritative text may be central under a “command conception” 
 
 95. See Tushnet, supra note 29, at 819 n.119.  
 96. See SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 173 (2006) 
(suggesting constitutional amendments and a more general constitutional convention to revise 
the text); see also Rapaczynski, supra note 82, at 202 (“Vague as the seventh amendment may 
be, every lawyer knows that a judiciary reform akin to that adopted in Britain, which for all 
practical purposes abolished the jury in civil cases, could not pass muster in the Unites States, 
even in the face of very strong evidence that the present system is less accurate or more wasteful 
than the alternative.”). 
 97. See supra text accompanying notes 38–40. 
 98. See generally, e.g., MARK R. LEVIN, THE LIBERTY AMENDMENTS: RESTORING THE 
AMERICAN REPUBLIC (2013). 
 99. BALKIN, supra note 2, at 55. 
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of law (which envisions law as emanating from a central sovereign 
source), it is much less central to customary and common law 
conceptions.100 More fundamentally, as the legal philosopher H.L.A. 
Hart explained, the extent to which particular materials are viewed as 
law turns on the relevant community’s rules of recognition.101 It may 
be correct to say, as Balkin does, that the American interpretive 
community views the constitutional text as a particularly sacrosanct 
form of law, but this observation does not itself explain why that is 
the case. 
The particular role of the constitutional text in American 
interpretive practice (like other features of the practice) may be 
historically contingent, as H. Jefferson Powell has argued.102 
Relatedly, it is possible that constitutional text plays a less significant 
role in the interpretive practices of some countries than it does in the 
United States.103 If so, then the role of the constitutional text does not 
follow automatically from the idea of fidelity to law, which many 
nations share—including nations like the United Kingdom, New 
Zealand, and Israel, which lack written constitutions.104 Moreover, as 
noted above, international law has an extensive amount of written 
law (in the form of treaties), and yet it is understood that such written 
law can in theory be superseded by customary norms.105 
 
 100. See STRAUSS, supra note 2, at 36–38. 
 101. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 94–99 (2d ed. 1994); see generally THE RULE 
OF RECOGNITION AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION (Matthew D. Adler & Kenneth Einar Himma 
eds., 2009) (applying the concept of the rule of recognition to U.S. constitutional law); Akhil 
Reed Amar, The Supreme Court, 1999 Term—Foreword: The Document and the Doctrine, 114 
HARV. L. REV. 26, 33 (2000) (“Of course, any document can claim to be supreme law. 
Something more is needed to make it so. That something, according to legal positivists, is social 
convention.”). 
 102. See H. JEFFERSON POWELL, A COMMUNITY BUILT ON WORDS: THE CONSTITUTION IN 
HISTORY AND POLITICS 6 (2005) (“Constitutional law is historically conditioned and politically 
shaped.”). 
 103. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV. 
1787, 1809–10 (2005) (“Many countries have had written constitutions that appeared on paper 
to meet high moral standards but that were ignored in practice or otherwise rendered 
meaningless through interpretation.”); David S. Law & Mila Versteeg, Sham Constitutions, 101 
CALIF. L. REV. 863, 870 (2013) (defining “sham constitutionalism” as “[t]he failure to perform 
upon self-imposed, publicly proclaimed commitments”; attempting to measure empirically the 
robustness of this phenomenon; and finding that (among many other things) Africa and Asia 
are home to a substantial majority of the world’s sham constitutions). 
 104. See, e.g., Levinson, supra note 76, at 709 (“Some countries have a constitutional system 
that is based largely on unwritten conventions and not on a single, sanctified text. Other 
countries have official, parchment constitutions that are mostly or entirely ignored.”). 
 105. See supra text accompanying note 78. Nor does the existence of a written constitution 
compel an originalist approach to constitutional interpretation. See generally Andrew B. Coan, 
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There is another potential problem with Balkin’s account that is 
even more salient for present purposes. Framework originalism, 
Balkin suggests, involves applying the original semantic meaning of 
the constitutional text. He explains that this enterprise produces 
results that are largely in accord with the convictions of Americans 
living today, rather than those long gone, because the semantic 
meaning of the text often sounds in principles or standards rather 
than rules. When applying the text, Balkin writes, post-Founding 
interpreters have in effect been delegated substantial discretion to 
flesh out the meaning of the Constitution in practice. This account, 
however, does not sufficiently consider the extent to which American 
interpretive practice stretches the text or adopts workarounds that 
render it less important.106 Interpreters do not simply apply the 
semantic meaning of the text, and they do not necessarily take the 
text as given. To return to Balkin’s metaphor of building out a preset 
framework, sometimes interpreters instead shift to an alternative 
foundation. Thus, whereas Strauss’s account seems to give too little 
weight to the text, Balkin’s account seems to give too much. 
Indeed, Balkin’s insistence that participants in the practice 
adhere to original semantic meaning is in tension with his recognition 
of the importance of citizens and social movements in constitutional 
development. Balkin’s account seeks to explain “how the entire 
system of constitutional construction—including the work of the 
political branches, courts, political parties, social movements, interest 
groups, and individual citizens—is consistent with democratic 
legitimacy.”107 By describing citizens and social movements as 
engaged in “construction,” Balkin assumes fidelity to the original 
framework, because construction, under his theory, takes place on the 
framework. The difficulty for Balkin’s account is that successful social 
 
The Irrelevance of Writtenness in Constitutional Interpretation, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1025, 1067 
(2010) (arguing that a comparative examination of the legal regimes in other countries 
establishes “that originalism is nothing like the dominant approach among large, well-
functioning constitutional democracies”). 
 106. See STRAUSS, supra note 2, at 106–11; see also Mark Tushnet, Constitutional 
Workarounds, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1499, 1503 (2009) (observing that when “[f]inding some 
constitutional text obstructing our ability to reach a desired goal, we work around that text using 
other texts—and do so without (obviously) distorting the tools we use”). 
 107. See BALKIN, supra note 2, at 279. 
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movements may have little idea about, or interest in, the original 
semantic meaning of the constitutional text.108 
For example, many political advocates for gun rights invoke the 
text of the Second Amendment, but they presumably know little or 
nothing about the original meaning of the Second Amendment. 
Likewise, many political advocates for gay rights invoke the text of 
the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses, but they presumably 
know little or nothing about the original meaning of these clauses—
let alone the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment’s 
Due Process Clause.109 Notwithstanding such ignorance on questions 
of original meaning, the activities of these advocates and those of 
their adversaries have greatly affected the constitutional 
understandings that enter public discourse and, eventually, judicial 
decisions. Balkin’s living constitutionalist theory of constitutional 
change can account for this phenomenon only if he insulates his living 
constitutionalism from his framework originalism, and only if he ties 
his living constitutionalism to the bare text—which social movements 
do know and routinely invoke—shorn of its original semantic 
meaning. To be descriptively accurate about the practice of American 
constitutional interpretation, in other words, Balkin must give up his 
originalism. 
C. Omissions in the Present Debate 
Although Strauss’s focal point theory and Balkin’s legal fidelity 
theory both offer important insights about the role of the 
constitutional text, they also share an important limitation. Neither 
sufficiently acknowledges the extent to which the perceived clarity of 
the text is not only a product of traditional “plain meaning” 
considerations such as dictionary definitions and linguistic 
conventions, but can also be affected by considerations that are 
commonly thought to come into play only in resolving textual 
ambiguities. In this regard, these accounts are somewhat like those of 
the textualists and originalists whom CLS scholars critiqued in the 
1980s, with the important difference that Balkin and Strauss view the 
 
 108. See Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism and Its Discontents (Plus a Thought or Two About 
Abortion), 24 CONST. COMMENT. 383, 394–95 (2007); Dorf, supra note 71, at 2043, 2055; Siegel, 
supra note 92, at 937–38.  
 109. See Siegel, supra note 92, at 938. For a discussion of the Supreme Court’s extension of 
the equal protection guarantee to conduct by the federal government, see infra Part II.C. 
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text, even when clear, as resolving relatively little of significance to 
modern constitutional debates.110 
This Article contends that it is important to investigate not only 
why American interpreters regard themselves as bound by 
constitutional text that they deem clear (which Strauss and Balkin 
seek to explain), but also what factors affect perceptions of textual 
clarity (which they do not pursue). The constitutional text is not 
merely a fixed structure to be built upon, to use Balkin’s metaphor. 
Rather, the text is also something that is itself partly constructed and 
reconstructed. The next Part uses a variety of case studies to illustrate 
the phenomenon that this Article calls “constructed constraint.” 
II.  CONSTRUCTING TEXTUAL AMBIGUITY OR CLARITY 
Participants in American constitutional practice typically agree 
that, when the constitutional text is clear, it is controlling. They often 
debate, however, whether the text is clear and, to the extent that it is 
not, what should be consulted in resolving textual ambiguities. What 
these debates obscure is that the perception of clarity or ambiguity is 
itself often affected by interpretive considerations that are commonly 
thought to be extratextual. In other words, the clarity of the 
constitutional text is partly constructed in American interpretive 
practice. To illustrate the construction of textual ambiguity or clarity, 
this Part presents a variety of case studies, some involving individual 
rights and others involving constitutional structure.111 
 
 110. See also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional 
Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1196 (1987) (“One reason we see relatively few 
arguments from the text is that the language of the Constitution, considered as a factor 
independent from the other kinds of argument familiar in constitutional debate, resolves so few 
hard questions.”). 
 111. An analogous issue arises regarding the Chevron doctrine in administrative law. That 
doctrine is often described as having two steps. First, a court determines whether a statute that 
is administered by an agency is clear. If so, the court simply applies the statute, even if contrary 
to the agency’s interpretation. If the statute is unclear, however, the court proceeds to the 
second step and considers whether the agency reasonably construed the ambiguous language in 
the statute. Some commentators have noted that, for purposes of step one, factors other than 
the semantic meaning of the text can affect the perception of textual clarity. See, e.g., Cass R. 
Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2106 (1990) 
(“Whether there is ambiguity—the nominal trigger for deference under Chevron—is a function 
not ‘simply’ of text, but of text as it interacts with principles of interpretation, some of them 
deeply engrained in the legal culture or even the culture more generally.”); cf. Matthew C. 
Stephenson & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron Has Only One Step, 95 VA. L. REV. 597, 598 (2009) 
(understanding Chevron not as involving two steps but as involving “a single inquiry into the 
reasonableness of the agency’s statutory interpretation”). Of less relevance here, some 
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The suggestion that the clarity or ambiguity of the constitutional 
text is partially constructed by interpretive practice is consistent with 
some of the claims about interpretation made by CLS scholars in the 
1980s, as discussed in Part I.A. But the phenomenon described in this 
Part, it should be emphasized, is one of constructed constraint. As the 
case studies show, for any given issue there are limits on the extent to 
which textual clarity is subject to extratextual construction. As 
discussed in Part III.B.3, moreover, a number of important 
constitutional provisions appear to be subject to construction only in 
the most extraordinary circumstances. 
A. Modalities of Constitutional Interpretation 
Philip Bobbitt, in his 1982 book Constitutional Fate, identified six 
“modalities” of constitutional argument that participants in American 
constitutional practice—from the time of the Marshall Court to the 
present—have invoked as authority to support their favored 
interpretations of the Constitution.112 Bobbitt’s catalogue has proven 
enormously influential. For example, it has been taught in American 
law schools, either explicitly or implicitly, to generations of law 
students.113  
In Bobbitt’s rendition, textual arguments rely on the language of 
the text of the Constitution, as well as the rules for interpreting 
constitutional texts (as opposed to other kinds of legal texts, 
especially statutes). Historical arguments appeal either to 
preratification history (such as debates over whether to ratify the 
Constitution) or to postratification history (such as arguments from 
tradition, historic governmental practices, or societal changes). 
Structural arguments examine the constitutional text (or a part of the 
constitutional text) as a whole, drawing inferences from the theory 
and structure of government created by the Constitution in order to 
discern how the constitutional system is supposed to function in 
 
commentators argue that there is now a “Step Zero” to determine whether the agency action 
falls within the domain of what Chevron covers. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step 
Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 191 (2007) (“But in the last period, the most important and confusing 
questions have involved . . . . Chevron Step-Zero—the initial inquiry into whether the Chevron 
framework applies at all.”). 
 112. See generally BOBBITT, supra note 77; PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL 
INTERPRETATION 11–22 (1993) (identifying and applying his six modalities of constitutional 
argument).  
 113. See, e.g., PAUL BREST ET AL., PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING 53–
59 (5th ed. 2006) (using Bobbitt’s typology to identify the kinds of constitutional arguments 
invoked by Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland). 
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practice. Ethos arguments tell a story about national identity; they 
typically take a narrative or historical form and ask whether a given 
interpretation of the Constitution exhibits fidelity to the meaning or 
destiny of the country, its deepest cultural commitments, or its 
national character. Prudential or consequentialist arguments identify 
the good or bad social consequences of an interpretation. Precedential 
arguments offer the existence of previous decisions, either of past 
political practice or past judicial rulings, as justifying a certain 
outcome in a later case. 
As illuminating as Bobbitt’s typology is, there are at least two 
reasons not to be strictly bound by it. First, Bobbitt’s typology omits 
certain modalities. For example, invocations of the purpose of a 
constitutional provision warrant separate treatment because they are 
distinguishable from both the textual modality and the structural 
approach. Purposivism shares with textual interpretation a focus on 
particular constitutional provisions, but there can be tensions 
between “plain meaning” arguments and purposive arguments, as 
textualists are quick to point out.114 In addition, purposivism shares 
with structural interpretation a concern with the proper functioning 
of the constitutional system, either in whole or in part, but 
purposivism is clause-bound in a way that structural argumentation is 
not.115 
Second, Bobbitt groups together certain kinds of constitutional 
arguments that warrant being separated. Judicial and political 
precedent are both forms of precedential reasoning, but they are 
significantly different forms. With customary political branch practice, 
unlike U.S. Supreme Court precedent, a single prior action or 
decision generally does not warrant deference in constitutional 
interpretation. Instead, the search is typically for longstanding 
patterns of behavior by the political branches. Similarly, it is not 
obvious that preratification and postratification history are best 
 
 114. See generally, e.g., John F. Manning, The Eleventh Amendment and the Reading of 
Precise Constitutional Texts, 113 YALE L.J. 1663 (2004); John F. Manning, What Divides 
Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 70 (2006) [hereinafter Manning, What 
Divides]. 
 115. There may be other modalities. For example, the Supreme Court sometimes has 
considered the authority typically possessed by nations in the international community when 
construing the constitutional authority of Congress or the president in foreign affairs. See, e.g., 
Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 711 (1893) (“The United States are a sovereign 
and independent nation, and are vested by the Constitution with the entire control of 
international relations, and with all the powers of government necessary to maintain that 
control, and to make it effective.”). 
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considered jointly and distinguished from textual argument. 
Originalists, for example, are likely to accept the former but not the 
latter as relevant to textual interpretation, especially if the 
postratification practice occurs long after the Founding.116 
Whatever the right list, the modality of textual argumentation is 
typically considered distinct from the other modalities. Nontextual 
modalities can appropriately be considered, according to the 
orthodox view, only to resolve ambiguities in the text. The Supreme 
Court has endorsed this proposition in numerous decisions.117 
Moreover, when dissenting opinions invoke the proposition, the 
majority does not contest it; instead, the majority typically argues that 
the text is unclear or inapplicable.118 The proposition that clear text is 
controlling has rhetorical power precisely because of the widely 
shared assumption that it is an essentially incontestable principle of 
American constitutional interpretation. 
The examples below reveal, however, that this standard 
bifurcation between clear and unclear text tends to overlook an 
 
 116. Some originalists may accept the proposition that postratification practices helped to 
“liquidate” certain ambiguities in the text of the Constitution. See generally, e.g., Caleb Nelson, 
Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 519 (2003). For a critical analysis 
of the concept of liquidation, see Curtis A. Bradley & Neil S. Siegel, After Recess: Historical 
Practice, Textual Ambiguity, and Constitutional Adverse Possession, 2014 SUP. CT. REV. 
(forthcoming). 
 117. See, e.g., Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 8 n.7 (1957) (plurality opinion) (“This Court has 
constantly reiterated that the language of the Constitution where clear and unambiguous must 
be given its plain evident meaning.”); United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, 731–32 (1931) 
(“The Constitution was written to be understood by the voters; its words and phrases were used 
in their normal and ordinary as distinguished from technical meaning; where the intention is 
clear there is no room for construction and no excuse for interpolation or addition.”); Lake 
Cnty. v. Rollins, 130 U.S. 662, 670 (1889) (“[W]hen the text of a constitutional provision is 
not ambiguous, the courts, in giving construction thereto, are not at liberty to search for its 
meaning beyond the instrument.”); Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. 213, 302–03 (1827) (“If this 
provision in the constitution was unambiguous, and its meaning entirely free from doubt, there 
would be no door left open for construction, or any proper ground upon which the intention of 
the framers of the constitution could be inquired into: this Court would be bound to give to it its 
full operation, whatever might be the views entertained of its expediency.”). Similarly, in the 
Supreme Court’s recent recess appointments decision discussed below in Part II.F, no Justice 
suggested that extratextual considerations such as historical practice could trump clear text. 
Rather, the two coalitions disagreed about whether the text was clear and about the extent to 
which extratextual considerations should inform the interpretation of ambiguous text. 
 118. Compare, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 116 (1996) (Souter, J., 
dissenting) (“[P]lain text is the Man of Steel in a confrontation with ‘background principle[s]’ 
and ‘postulates which limit and control.’”) (citations omitted), with id. at 69 (Rehnquist, J., 
majority opinion) (“The dissent’s lengthy analysis of the text of the Eleventh Amendment is 
directed at a straw man . . . .”). See also infra Part II.F (discussing the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Noel Canning). 
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important aspect of American interpretive practice: the same 
considerations that are potentially relevant in resolving the meaning 
of ambiguous text can also affect the perceived clarity of the text in 
the first instance. Although it is not possible to determine the extent 
of this phenomenon through a limited series of examples, the ones 
discussed below reflect mainstream and significant areas of 
constitutional law. Moreover, each of these examples illustrates the 
influence of multiple modalities. As a result, it seems fair to conclude 
that the phenomenon described here, even if its precise frequency is 
uncertain, is an important and recurring feature of U.S. constitutional 
practice. To the extent that accounts of American interpretive 
practice fail to incorporate this phenomenon, they are incomplete.119 
The examples that follow illustrate how a variety of modalities 
come into play, often in an interactive fashion, in constructing 
understandings about clarity and ambiguity in the constitutional text. 
Some of these examples involve the interpretation of specific words in 
 
 119. This account bears some resemblance to Richard Fallon’s “constructivist coherence” 
theory of constitutional interpretation, although the objectives and natures of the two projects 
are distinct. Fallon’s theory aims “to supply a needed structure to decisionmakers struggling 
with difficult constitutional issues.” Fallon, supra note 110, at 1269. Specifically, Fallon seeks to 
help decisionmakers solve “the commensurability problem”—that is, “the problem of how 
different kinds of constitutional argument are appropriately combined and weighed against each 
other within our constitutional practice.” Id. at 1285. According to Fallon’s influential theory, it 
typically is possible for constitutional interpreters to achieve “constructivist coherence,” a 
Rawlsian reflective equilibrium in which the various modalities influence one another or, 
occasionally, cause reassessments, with the result that interpreters are able to come to rest on a 
particular outcome. When such an effort to achieve coherence fails, Fallon’s theory calls for 
assigning “the categories of argument . . . a hierarchical order in which the highest ranked factor 
clearly requiring an outcome prevails over lower ranked factors.” Id. at 1191. Fallon concludes 
that “the implicit norms of our constitutional practice accord the foremost authority to 
arguments from text, followed, in descending order, by arguments concerning the framers’ 
intent, constitutional theory, precedent, and moral and policy values.” Id. at 1193–94. Because 
he wants to show how the commensurability problem can be solved, Fallon focuses on the 
substantial interrelatedness and interdependence among all of the different kinds of 
constitutional argument. By contrast, this Article does not attempt to solve the 
commensurability problem. Rather, its primary goal is to demonstrate the construction of 
textual clarity or ambiguity in particular. Relatedly, Fallon’s theory is interpretive and therefore 
has both descriptive and normative elements. See, e.g., id. at 1233. By contrast, this Article is 
primarily descriptive. For an approach similar to Fallon’s in the area of statutory interpretation, 
which draws from the philosophical insights of hermeneutics and pragmatism to describe and 
defend statutory interpretation as a form of practical reasoning, see generally William N. 
Eskridge, Jr. & Philip J. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. 
REV. 321 (1990). 
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the Constitution. Others involve an interpretation of the scope or 
exclusivity of particular provisions.120 
B. Nonliteral Construction: The First Word of the First Amendment 
Construed literally, the text of the First Amendment seems 
directed at Congress alone: it provides that “Congress shall make no 
law . . . .”121 It does not appear to be directed at the federal 
government generally, such as the Executive Branch, the 
treatymakers, and the federal judiciary.122 Not surprisingly, therefore, 
strict textualists read it in this restrictive fashion. In fact, Gary 
Lawson and Guy Seidman not only conclude that “the First 
Amendment by its terms does not apply to executive and judicial 
action,” but also argue that “[t]o read the First Amendment to apply 
to entities other than Congress is simply to abandon the enterprise of 
textual interpretation.”123 Likewise, Nicholas Rosenkranz has urged 
that “precisely because, as a textual matter, the First Amendment is 
such an easy case, it presents the starkest counterpoint to 
conventional wisdom—which willfully ignores the subject of the First 
Amendment.”124 Mark Denbeaux has made an originalist argument in 
support of the same conclusion.125 
 
 120. The examples primarily, although not exclusively, involve the construction of ambiguity 
rather than clarity. It is more difficult to discern the construction of clarity because, by 
definition, those involved in the interpretive practice may not perceive that the text could have 
been interpreted otherwise. Consider, for example, the constitutional requirement that “[n]o 
person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United States, at the time of the 
Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the Office of President.” U.S. CONST. art. II, 
§ 1, cl. 5 (emphasis added). Because of the placement of the commas, this clause, if read 
literally, suggests that only individuals alive at the time the Constitution was adopted are 
eligible to be president. For purposive and consequentialist reasons, however, the clause never 
has been read that way. See generally Jordan Steiker, Sanford Levinson & J.M. Balkin, Taking 
Text and Structure Really Seriously: Constitutional Interpretation and the Crisis of Presidential 
Eligibility, 74 TEX. L. REV. 237 (1995). For another example of the construction of textual 
clarity, see the discussion of Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion in Noel Canning in Part II.F. 
 121. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 122. The first word says “Congress,” not “the United States,” and the text elsewhere 
distinguishes the legislative power of Congress (see Article I, Section 8) from the enforcement 
power of the Executive (see the Take Care Clause of Article II, Section 3). 
 123. GARY LAWSON & GUY SEIDMAN, THE CONSTITUTION OF EMPIRE: TERRITORIAL 
EXPANSION AND AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 42 (2004) (footnote omitted).  
 124. Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, The Subjects of the Constitution, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1210, 
1250 (2010). 
 125. See Mark P. Denbeaux, The First Word of the First Amendment, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 
1156, 1201 (1986) (“None of the various sources of relevant information provides any evidence 
to alter, vary, or contradict the plain meaning of the first word of the first amendment.”). 
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American constitutional practice, however, has always viewed 
the First Amendment as relevant to the conduct of the entire federal 
government, not just Congress. As far back as 1833, Circuit Justice 
Henry Baldwin observed that the First Amendment “wholly prohibits 
the action of the legislative or judicial power of the Union on the 
subject matter of a religious establishment, or any restraint on the 
free exercise of religion.”126 More recently, the Court has taken for 
granted that First Amendment principles govern executive and 
judicial actions, both federal and state.127 
Consider, for example, the famous Pentagon Papers Case,128 
which the Court decided in 1971. The Court there rejected on First 
Amendment grounds President Nixon’s request that a federal court 
enjoin the New York Times and the Washington Post from publishing 
what the Executive Branch deemed national security secrets 
regarding the conduct of the Vietnam War.129 No federal statute was 
at issue; the case turned exclusively on the president’s request for a 
judicial prior restraint on speech. Even so, the Court viewed the First 
Amendment as controlling without so much as pausing to consider 
the potential import of the first word of the First Amendment. The 
Justices viewed the First Amendment as so clearly not limited to 
Congress that they did not even see the first word.130 
 
 126. Magill v. Brown, 16 F. Cas. 408, 427 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1837) (Baldwin, J.). As Jack Balkin 
notes, although Magill was “the earliest federal decision even to imagine that there was an 
issue,” it “simply assumed that the First Amendment applied to all branches of the federal 
government.” BALKIN, supra note 2, at 205; see also Shrum v. City of Coweta, 449 F.3d 1132, 
1142 (10th Cir. 2006) (majority opinion of McConnell, J.) (“As this history shows, there was no 
intention to confine the reach of the First Amendment to the legislative branch.”). 
 127. See, e.g., Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 441–42 (1988) 
(subjecting the conduct of the U.S. Forest Service to scrutiny under the Free Exercise Clause); 
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 407 (1963) (reviewing the denial of unemployment 
compensation by a state employment security commission for consistency with the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments); Carroll v. President of Princess Anne Cnty., 393 U.S. 175, 185 (1968) 
(invalidating a prior restraint ordered by a state court); Org. for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 
U.S. 415, 420 (1971) (same). 
 128. N.Y. Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). 
 129. Id. at 714. 
 130. See, e.g., id. at 715 (Black, J., concurring) (“Now, for the first time in the 182 years since 
the founding of the Republic, the federal courts are asked to hold that the First Amendment 
does not mean what it says, but rather means that the Government can halt the publication of 
current news of vital importance to the people of this country.”) (emphasis added); Justice 
Douglas, see id. at 720 (Douglas, J., concurring), and Justice Brennan, see id. at 725 (Brennan, J., 
concurring), made similar statements. Nor did the dissenters (Burger, Harlan, and Blackmun) 
pause over the first word of the First Amendment. 
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Although the Court itself has not provided an explanation for its 
approach, legal scholars have defended it vigorously. For example, 
Akhil Amar writes that “[t]he First Amendment’s first word, 
‘Congress,’ is now read as a synecdoche: The right of free expression 
applies against all branches of the federal government and rightly 
so.”131 “If the president and federal courts cannot censor citizens even 
with the backing of a congressional law,” Amar reasons, “it would be 
odd to think that they can do so without such a law.”132 “In essence,” 
Amar writes elsewhere, “the amendment declared certain preexisting 
principles of liberty and self-government—‘the free exercise of 
religion’ and ‘the freedom of speech, [and] of the press’—that 
implicitly applied against all federal branches (not just Congress) and 
all federal actions (not just laws).”133 Underscoring the stakes, he adds 
that “a president today may not condition a pardon on a promise that 
the recipient will not join a particular church or will refrain from 
speaking out against the administration; nor may federal judges 
impose a religious test on courtroom spectators or bar them from 
publishing criticism of the judiciary.”134 
Similarly, Jack Balkin argues that the reference to “Congress” in 
the First Amendment is a clear case of nonliteral usage—that it is “a 
synecdoche or metonym that stands for all of the lawmaking and law 
enforcement operations of the federal government.”135 Alternatively, 
he argues that if “Congress” means only “Congress” as a matter of 
semantic meaning, then a structural principle of anticircumvention 
should be understood to supplement the text.136 Like Amar, Balkin 
stresses some arresting consequences of reaching the opposite 
conclusion: 
[T]erritorial legislatures and federal sheriffs could punish people for 
speaking out against the government or practicing their religion. 
Federal judges could issue prior restraints against books distributed 
in the nation’s capitol, federal post offices could refuse to deliver 
mail the president did not like, and the president, acting in his 
 
 131. AMAR, supra note 1, at 34. 
 132. Id.; see also id. (“Limits on the less electorally accountable branches of the federal 
government follow a fortiori from those imposed on Congress.”). 
 133. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 316 (2005). 
 134. Id. 
 135. BALKIN, supra note 2, at 204–05. 
 136. See id. at 204. 
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capacity as commander in chief, could order all U.S. soldiers to pray 
to the same god for victory.137 
Balkin does not see how any principle that would distinguish 
congressional censorship from judicial or executive censorship 
“makes sense either at the time of the founding or today, and a very 
long history of practice rejects the idea.”138 
Putting aside the proper interpretation of the term “Congress” in 
the First Amendment, it is instructive to consider why American 
constitutional practice has never adopted the term’s literal meaning. 
Nothing in the literal meaning of the term seems unclear,139 
particularly given the definition of the term “Congress” in Article I, 
Section 1, as “consist[ing] of a Senate and House of 
Representatives.”140 Instead, any lack of clarity appears to be driven 
by considerations sounding in constitutional purposes, structural and 
consequentialist considerations, longstanding practice, and extensive 
judicial precedent.141 For example, no account of the basic objectives 
of the First Amendment—whether realizing collective self-
governance, promoting public debate, protecting personal autonomy, 
or finding truth through a marketplace of ideas142—can explain why 
congressional speech suppression should often be prohibited but 
executive or judicial speech suppression should always be permitted. 
As a result, American interpretive practice has never purported to 
allow presidents and judges to act contrary to the basic purposes of 
 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Likewise, a literal reading of Article I, Section 3, appears to imply that the vice 
president may preside over his or her own impeachment. But that cannot be correct. See AMAR, 
supra note 1, at 3–22.    
 140. See also supra note 122 (noting additional reasons why the literal meaning of the word 
“Congress” in the First Amendment seems clear). 
 141. One might add an originalist argument, as then-Judge Michael McConnell did in Shrum 
v. City of Coweta in concluding that the Free Exercise Clause applies to executive action. See 
Shrum v. City of Coweta, 449 F.3d 1132, 1140–41 (10th Cir. 2006) (examining evidence 
concerning the intent of the drafters of the First Amendment); id. at 1142 (refuting Denbeaux, 
see supra note 125, at 1169–70). But given that the Supreme Court has not seemed interested in 
the original history, and given that few commentators would deem that history decisive, it is 
doubtful that a commitment to originalism explains the practice of reading “Congress” in the 
First Amendment nonliterally. 
 142. See, e.g., ROBERT C. POST, Meiklejohn’s Mistake: Individual Autonomy and the Reform 
of Public Discourse, in CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY, COMMUNITY, 
MANAGEMENT 268–89 (1995) [hereinafter CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS] (critically analyzing 
different theoretical accounts of the function of the First Amendment). 
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the First Amendment while prohibiting Congresses from doing so.143 
Indeed, exempting presidents and courts from the strictures of the 
First Amendment has been viewed as so fundamentally 
counterpurposive that most constitutional interpreters have followed 
Amar and Balkin in deeming the First Amendment not as ambiguous, 
but as clearly meaning the opposite of what it literally seems to say. 
C. “Thinkability”: Equal Protection and the Federal Government 
Bolling v. Sharpe144 was one of four companion cases to Brown v. 
Board of Education,145 which held that de jure racial segregation by 
states in public education violates the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.146 All five cases involved racial segregation 
in public education. The Court disposed of Bolling separately, 
however, because it concerned segregation in the District of 
Columbia, which is a federal enclave for constitutional purposes, and 
the Equal Protection Clause by its terms applies only to states, not 
the federal government. Even so, the Court in Bolling invalidated 
racial segregation by the federal government as well. 
As David Strauss observes, even though “Bolling has, at best, a 
very uncertain basis in the text of the Constitution,” the decision “has 
not only survived, but thrived.”147 Nevertheless, the decision remains 
controversial among some commentators because of an alleged lack 
of support in the text of the Constitution and because of an 
 
 143. Notably, even strict textualists identify workarounds to render their interpretations less 
disruptive of existing practice. See, e.g., Rosenkranz, supra note 124, at 1272 n.253 (arguing that 
the Take Care Clause “reflects a principle of nondiscrimination (on the basis of speech and 
religion, among other things) in the execution of law”); Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, The 
Objects of the Constitution, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1005, 1061 (2011) (arguing that if free speech is a 
privilege or immunity of national citizenship, “it is protected more comprehensively at the state 
level than at the federal level,” and thus may include challenges to state executive or judicial 
action); see also Daniel J. Hemel, Executive Action and the First Amendment’s First Word, 40 
PEPP. L. REV. 601, 604 (2013) (contending that “executive action that encroaches upon First 
Amendment freedom is either (a) action authorized by a statute, in which case the statute itself 
violates the First Amendment, or (b) ultra vires executive action that runs afoul of the Fifth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause”). Such efforts to discern workarounds often seem sensitive 
to the same considerations that affect perceptions of textual clarity and thus can themselves be 
seen as part of the phenomenon of constructed constraint. 
 144. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). 
 145. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 146. Id. at 495. 
 147. David A. Strauss, Not Unwritten, After All?, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1532, 1541 (2013) 
(reviewing AMAR, supra note 1); see also United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013) 
(citing Bolling with approval); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 201 (1995) 
(same). 
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observation that Chief Justice Warren made at the end of his short 
opinion: “In view of our decision that the Constitution prohibits the 
states from maintaining racially segregated public schools, it would be 
unthinkable that the same Constitution would impose a lesser duty on 
the Federal Government.”148 This statement has been read to suggest 
that extralegal considerations took precedence over constitutional 
principle.149 
It is of course possible that the Court was simply ignoring or 
overriding the constitutional text without saying so. It is worth noting, 
however, that the Court began its analysis with the text, invoking the 
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.150 Moreover, rather 
than asserting that this clause contains an equal protection 
component, as the opinion is commonly interpreted today, the Court 
appeared to conduct a substantive due process analysis.151 Writing for 
the Court, Chief Justice Warren reasoned that “the concepts of equal 
protection and due process, both stemming from our American ideal 
of fairness, are not mutually exclusive,” and that “discrimination may 
be so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process.”152 Turning to the 
case at hand, he concluded that “[s]egregation in public education is 
not reasonably related to any proper governmental objective, and 
thus it imposes on Negro children of the District of Columbia a 
burden that constitutes an arbitrary deprivation of their liberty in 
violation of the Due Process Clause.”153 This language is plausibly 
read to reflect substantive due process reasoning.154 
In support of both the result in Bolling and the Court’s reliance 
on the Due Process Clause, Jack Balkin has offered an originalist 
argument that “due process already includes ideas of equal 
 
 148. Bolling, 347 U.S. at 500. 
 149. See, e.g., Kenneth L. Karst, The Fifth Amendment’s Guarantee of Equal Protection, 55 
N.C. L. REV. 541, 546 (1977) (noting that the reasoning in Bolling “lay the Court open to the 
charge that what it found ‘unthinkable’ was the political implication of a contrary decision, 
rather than an anomaly of constitutional principle”). 
 150. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law.”). 
 151. Although the Court and commentators have read Bolling as “finding” an equal 
protection “component” in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, Lawrence Lessig 
observes that “[n]o such ‘component’ was ever ‘found’” in Bolling. Lawrence Lessig, 
Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 47 STAN. L. REV. 395, 409 (1995). 
 152. Bolling, 347 U.S. at 499. 
 153. Id. at 500. 
 154. For a discussion of how the substantive due process analysis in Bolling could be seen as 
building on suggestions in earlier decisions, see generally Karst, supra note 149. 
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protection.”155 Many legal scholars, however, are skeptical that 
Bolling can be justified on originalist grounds.156 Regardless of who 
has the better of this historical argument, it seems unlikely that any 
Justice, including the self-identified originalists Antonin Scalia and 
Clarence Thomas, “would permit the federal government to 
segregate schools in the District of Columbia, even though the only 
applicable constitutional provision is the Due Process Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment, which was ratified at a time when the Constitution 
contemplated slavery.”157 
Other commentators have supported the result in Bolling but not 
the Court’s reliance on the Due Process Clause. They have offered a 
variety of textual sources for the right declared in Bolling. For 
example, Bruce Ackerman has relied on the Citizenship Clause of 
Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment,158 and Mark Graber has 
pointed to the Privileges or Immunities Clause of that same section.159 
John Hart Ely invoked, among other things, the Ninth Amendment.160 
Taking a more holistic approach, Akhil Amar has relied on a 
combination of the Preamble, Article IV’s Guarantee Clause, Article 
I’s bans on federal and state titles of nobility and bills of attainder, 
and the Reconstruction Amendments, all of which (he argues) forbid 
the federal government from stigmatizing people because of who they 
are as members of an inferior caste.161 According to Amar, “In light of 
 
 155. BALKIN, supra note 2, at 252.  
 156. See, e.g., STRAUSS, supra note 2, at 130 (describing “[t]he principle [declared in Bolling] 
that the federal government may not discriminate” based on race as “one that neither the text of 
the Constitution nor the original understanding can support”); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RADICALS IN 
ROBES: WHY EXTREME RIGHT-WING COURTS ARE WRONG FOR AMERICA 2, 72, 131 (2005) 
(leveraging originalism’s inability to justify Bolling as a reason to reject constitutional 
“fundamentalism”); Brest, supra note 18, at 233 (stating that he “cannot think of a plausible 
argument against th[e] result [in Bolling]—other than the entirely correct originalist observation 
that it is not supported by even a generous reading of the fifth amendment”). 
 157. Post & Siegel, supra note 12, at 30; see also Fallon, supra note 103, at 1823 (“Justices of 
all substantive persuasions have felt entitled not only to uphold Bolling but also to expand upon 
its commitments.”). Some commentators, however, have argued that Bolling was wrongly 
decided. Most notably, see ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL 
SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 84 (1990) (criticizing Bolling as “social engineering from the bench”). 
 158. Bruce Ackerman, Ackerman, J., Concurring, in WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF 
EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID 100, 114–16 (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2001). 
 159. Mark A. Graber, A Constitutional Conspiracy Unmasked: Why “No State” Does Not 
Mean “No State”, 10 CONST. COMMENT. 87, 87 (1993). 
 160. See ELY, supra note 27, at 33; see also, e.g., MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION IN 
THE COURTS: LAW OR POLITICS? 146 (1994) (defending Bolling based on the Ninth 
Amendment). 
 161. AMAR, supra note 1, at 143–45. 
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all these constitutional clauses, all these structural considerations, and 
all this historical evidence, Brown and Bolling were not just correct 
but clearly correct.”162 
In sum, neither the Court nor most commentators have 
concluded that the federal government is free to discriminate on the 
basis of race without constitutional limit, even though the text of the 
Equal Protection Clause clearly does not apply to the federal 
government. Instead, some judges and commentators have invoked 
doctrinal or originalist reasoning in viewing the text of the Due 
Process Clause as compatible with the result in Bolling. Other 
commentators have invoked different portions of constitutional text 
to justify the result in the case. For interpreters in the first category, 
nontextual modalities of constitutional interpretation inform their 
judgment that the text of the Due Process Clause can support the 
result in Bolling. For interpreters in the second category, the clarity of 
the text of the Due Process Clause remains unaffected by other 
modalities of interpretation, but other constitutional text is deemed 
sufficient to support the result. 
What about Chief Justice Warren’s reference to the 
“unthinkable”? Read charitably, one way of understanding this 
statement is that the Court considered some combination of 
structural, consequentialist, purposive, and ethos considerations as 
relevant to determining what was a permissible interpretation of the 
text. Structurally, for example, it may seem odd that the same 
Congress that is charged with enforcing the guarantees of the Civil 
War Amendments against the states (including the right declared in 
Brown) would be free to ignore those very guarantees. It remains odd 
even if one can come up with (contestable) reasons why the federal 
government and the states are differently situated with respect to 
their relative likelihoods of violating minority rights.163 
 
 162. Id. at 145. For a recent originalist account that supports Amar’s view, see generally 
Ryan C. Williams, Originalism and the Other Desegregation Decision, 99 VA. L. REV. 493 
(2013). 
 163. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 522 (1989) (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (“A sound distinction between federal and state (or local) action based on race rests 
not only upon the substance of the Civil War Amendments, but upon social reality and 
governmental theory.” (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison))). The Court 
abandoned any such distinction in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) 
(“[W]e hold today that all racial classifications, imposed by whatever federal, state, or local 
governmental actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny.”). 
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In addition, there is little doubt that the Court in Brown and 
Bolling was committing itself to a certain conception of the American 
ethos—to the meaning and destiny of the country.164 Allowing the 
federal government to engage in practices of racial subordination was 
incompatible with that conception. The Warren Court took a 
significant gamble because its racially egalitarian conception of the 
American ethos conflicted with the dominant understanding in an 
entire region of the nation.165 
Whatever one may think of the various modalities of 
constitutional argument that the Court and commentators have 
invoked to justify (or, in rare instances, to condemn) Bolling, the 
decision illustrates the more general phenomenon that the 
constitutional text can be experienced as both constructed and 
constraining. Almost everyone who has considered whether the result 
in Bolling can be justified has attempted to find a way to connect 
what is morally desirable with the constitutional text. On the one 
hand, considerations of what the text can reasonably support appear 
themselves to be affected by this normative judgment. On the other 
hand, there seems to be a perception that the ability to work with the 
text is limited. For this issue, the shared acknowledgment that the text 
is not infinitely malleable causes some commentators to mine 
constitutional history, others to try to find text that is more suitable, 
still others to engage the Constitution holistically and structurally, 
and a remaining few to conclude that constitutional law has run out.166 
 
 164. See Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, The Idea of a Constitution, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 167, 167, 169 
(1987) (suggesting that the authority of the U.S. Constitution flows in important part from its 
status as the embodiment of Americans’ “fundamental nature as a people,” their national 
“ethos,” which “is sacred and demands our respectful acknowledgement”). 
 165. See, e.g., ROBERT C. POST, Theories of Constitutional Interpretation, in 
CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS, supra note 142, at 23, 43 (“The Court’s embrace of the value of 
racial equality could have been a misreading of the national ethos; indeed the Court’s gamble 
was intensely controversial and came close to failing precisely because the ethos was in fact so 
divided.”). 
 166. Another example of construction involving the Fifth Amendment concerns the 
meaning of the word “person.” The Fifth Amendment provides that “[n]o person . . . shall be 
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law.” U.S. CONST. amend. V. Although the privilege against 
self-incrimination has long been understood to protect only natural persons and not 
corporations, Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 75 (1906), the guarantee of due process has long been 
understood to protect corporations, Noble v. Union River Logging R.R., 147 U.S. 165, 176 
(1893). Because both the Self-Incrimination Clause and the Due Process Clause expressly 
protect “person[s],” the Court must have been using modalities other than the plain meaning of 
the word “person” to distinguish the two clauses. 
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D. What Clear Text Does and Does Not Cover: The Eleventh 
Amendment 
Sometimes textual clarity or ambiguity concerns what the text 
does and does not cover—that is, whether the text says all that there 
is to say about a certain matter, or whether interpreters should not 
draw such a negative inference. Adopted in 1795, the Eleventh 
Amendment reads, “The Judicial power of the United States shall not 
be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or 
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another 
State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”167 Although 
this amendment is the central textual support for the immunity of 
U.S. states from private lawsuits, it appears to apply only to suits 
brought by out-of-state residents and foreign citizens. Nevertheless, 
for more than one hundred years, the Supreme Court has held that 
states possess significant immunity from suits brought by their own 
citizens, and that state sovereign immunity applies in federal question 
as well as diversity cases. Since the 1990s, the Court has adopted a 
particularly expansive conception of this immunity. Regardless of the 
merits of the Court’s position, however, it is oversimplified to claim, 
as some critics have, that the Court has “been fighting the words of 
the [E]leventh [A]mendment,”168 or that its decisions “contradict the 
unambiguous limitations of the Eleventh Amendment’s text,”169 or 
that “the [E]leventh [A]mendment is universally taken not to mean 
what it says.”170 
The seminal decision holding that state sovereign immunity is 
broader than what is suggested by the text of the Eleventh 
Amendment is Hans v. Louisiana,171 in which a resident of Louisiana 
sued the state to recover unpaid interest on state bonds, arguing that 
the state had violated the Contracts Clause.172 Responding to the 
contention that the Eleventh Amendment is limited to suits by out-of-
state residents and foreign citizens, the Court acknowledged that the 
 
 167. U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
 168. Lawrence C. Marshall, Fighting the Words of the Eleventh Amendment, 102 HARV. L. 
REV. 1342, 1342 (1989). 
 169. Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1476 (1987). 
Amar, however, regarded the text of the Eleventh Amendment as the beginning, not the end, of 
his analysis. See id. at 1484. 
 170. Martha A. Field, The Eleventh Amendment and Other Sovereign Immunity Doctrines: 
Part One, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 515, 516 (1977).  
 171. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890). 
 172. Id. at 1. 
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text “does so read.”173 But the Court said that reading this language 
literally would create an “anomalous result” whereby federal 
question jurisdiction would be disallowed in cases brought by 
noncitizens, but allowed in cases brought by citizens.174 In attempting 
to avoid this result, the Court did not purport to disregard the text. 
Instead, it hypothesized that, rather than representing an effort to 
codify the constitutional law of sovereign immunity, the text was a 
specific response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Chisholm v. 
Georgia,175 in which the Court had controversially construed the 
Article III judicial power as extending to suits brought against states 
by out-of-state residents.176 
Ever since Hans, the Court has recognized a doctrine of state 
sovereign immunity that is more robust than the text of the Eleventh 
Amendment suggests. The Court has held, for example, that states 
enjoy immunity in admiralty actions, even though the text of the 
Eleventh Amendment refers only to suits in law and equity.177 It has 
also held that states are entitled to immunity when sued by foreign 
nations or Indian tribes, even though such suits are not mentioned in 
the Eleventh Amendment.178 More dramatically, the Court held in 
1996 that Congress generally lacks the authority to override state 
sovereign immunity, including in cases that do not fall within the 
terms of the Eleventh Amendment.179 In addition, the Court has held 
 
 173. Id. at 10. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). 
 176. Id. at 420. Several Justices in Chisholm emphasized that Article III expressly extends 
the judicial power to “controversies . . . between a State and citizens of another State.” See, e.g., 
id. at 431. 
 177. See, e.g., Ex parte New York, 256 U.S. 503, 511 (1921).   
 178. See, e.g., Blatchford v. Native Village of Notak, 501 U.S. 775, 788 (1991); Monaco v. 
Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 332 (1934). 
 179. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 76 (1996) (concluding that 
Congress may not abrogate state sovereign immunity using its powers under Article I, 
Section 8). The Court has held that Congress has some authority to override state sovereign 
immunity when acting under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Tennessee v. 
Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 533–34 (2004) (holding that Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act 
validly abrogates state sovereign immunity as applied to the fundamental right of access to the 
courts); Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 740 (2003) (holding that to remedy 
and deter violations of equal protection, Congress had authority under Section 5 to enact a 
provision of the Family and Medical Leave Act requiring employers to provide unpaid family 
leave to men and women); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976) (holding that the 
Eleventh Amendment is “necessarily limited by the enforcement provisions of § 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment”). It has also held that Congress has some authority to override 
immunity pursuant to its Article I power to regulate bankruptcy, notwithstanding the suggestion 
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that, even though the Eleventh Amendment speaks only to the 
judicial power of the federal courts, state sovereign immunity applies 
in state courts and federal administrative agencies.180 
The Court has explained that it has “understood the Eleventh 
Amendment to stand not so much for what it says, but for the 
presupposition . . . which it confirms.”181 A variety of other textual 
provisions, the Court has claimed, confirm that states “are not 
relegated to the role of mere provinces or political corporations, but 
retain the dignity, though not the full authority, of sovereignty.”182 
Under the Court’s account of the Founding, the states entered the 
Union as sovereigns, and, although they gave up some attributes of 
sovereignty, they did not (for the most part) relinquish their 
immunity from private lawsuits. The original Constitution, under this 
view, did not grant the national government authority to override the 
immunity attribute of sovereignty, and it did not give the federal 
courts the authority to hear private suits against unconsenting 
states.183 Chisholm, the argument runs, incorrectly held otherwise with 
respect to the Citizen–State Diversity Clauses of Article III, and the 
Eleventh Amendment corrected that mistake without limiting the 
more general background attribute of state sovereign immunity. 
Thus, the Court has claimed, “To rest on the words of the 
Amendment alone would be to engage in the type of ahistorical 
literalism we have rejected in interpreting the scope of the States’ 
sovereign immunity since the discredited decision in Chisholm.”184 
Notably, although the dissenting Justices in these cases have 
accused the majority of disregarding the text, they have argued for 
something other than the most literal reading of the Eleventh 
Amendment. Because the Eleventh Amendment refers to “any suit in 
law or equity,” the most literal reading of the text would, as noted 
above, bar federal court jurisdiction over federal question suits 
brought by out-of-state residents but not by in-state residents, a result 
 
in Seminole Tribe that none of Congress’s Article I powers was sufficient for this purpose. Cent. 
Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 379 (2006). 
 180. See Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 769 (2002); Alden v. Maine, 
527 U.S. 706, 754 (1999). 
 181. Blatchford, 501 U.S. at 779. 
 182. Alden, 527 U.S. at 715. 
 183. But cf. Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll., 546 U.S. at 373 (“Insofar as orders ancillary to the 
bankruptcy courts’ in rem jurisdiction, like orders directing turnover of preferential transfers, 
implicate States’ sovereign immunity from suit, the States agreed in the plan of the Convention 
not to assert that immunity.”). 
 184. Alden, 527 U.S. at 730. 
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that seems to make no sense from a structural or purposive 
perspective. As a result, and because the language of the Eleventh 
Amendment tracks the language of the Citizen–State Diversity 
Clauses of Article III, the dissenting Justices have contended that the 
Amendment should be interpreted as “simply repeal[ing] the Citizen-
State Diversity Clauses of Article III for all cases in which the State 
appears as a defendant.”185 This approach is attentive to the wording 
of the Eleventh Amendment, but not as attentive as the “plain 
meaning” theory of the Amendment, which would disallow the 
exercise even of federal question jurisdiction in a suit against a state 
by an out-of-state citizen. Accordingly, like the Justices in the 
majority, the dissenting Justices have read the Eleventh Amendment 
purposively.186 They have simply differed with the majority over 
whether the Amendment should be understood as a comprehensive 
approach to state sovereign immunity, an issue that turns in part on 
one’s view of the relevant history.187 
The modern Supreme Court’s claim about the original 
understanding of state sovereign immunity is obviously contestable, 
and it has been sharply disputed by dissenting Justices and numerous 
commentators. Some scholars have also disagreed on methodological 
grounds with the Court’s purposive approach to understanding what 
 
 185. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 109–10 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting); see 
also Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 289 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) 
(“[T]he [Eleventh] Amendment was intended to remedy an interpretation of the Constitution 
that would have had the state-citizen and state-alien diversity clauses of Article III abrogating 
the state law of sovereign immunity on state-law causes of action brought in federal courts.”). 
For commentary endorsing the diversity theory, see, for example, William A. Fletcher, A 
Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow Construction of an Affirmative 
Grant of Jurisdiction Rather than a Prohibition Against Jurisdiction, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1033, 1035 
(1983), and John J. Gibbons, Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A 
Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1889, 2005 (1983). 
 186. Even though he has supported a broader approach to immunity based in part on 
longstanding precedent, Justice Scalia (a self-proclaimed textualist) has acknowledged that if 
immunity were limited to the terms of the Eleventh Amendment, the diversity interpretation 
would be the best reading of the Amendment. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 
31 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that if the text of the 
Amendment were comprehensive, “it would unquestionably be most reasonable to interpret it 
as providing immunity only when the sole basis of federal jurisdiction is the diversity of 
citizenship that it describes”).  
 187. For an argument that the literal text of the Eleventh Amendment made sense when 
written, see Bradford R. Clark, The Eleventh Amendment and the Nature of the Union, 123 
HARV. L. REV. 1817, 1818 (2010). For arguments that the literal text should be followed 
regardless of whether it seems to make sense, see Marshall, supra note 168; Manning, What 
Divides, supra note 114, at 75; and Calvin R. Massey, State Sovereignty and the Tenth and 
Eleventh Amendments, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 61, 65 (1989). 
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the text of the Eleventh Amendment does and does not do.188 For the 
analysis here, the key point is not whether the Court is right—and 
most scholars, it should be noted, disagree with the Court—but what 
the example shows about the role of the constitutional text in making 
arguments about who is right. 
This example shows how the perceived clarity of the 
constitutional text can operate on more than one level. That is, the 
perceived clarity of the text can turn on what it says, and it can turn 
on whether it says all that there is to say.189 The Court has not 
disputed that the text covers only suits by out-of-state residents and 
foreign citizens, or that it applies only to suits in the federal courts. 
But, because of a mix of historical, structural, purposive, and 
consequentialist considerations, the Court has rejected the view that 
the Amendment is best read as a comprehensive provision, as 
opposed to a targeted response to Chisholm. In other words, the 
Court has rejected the negative inference that the Eleventh 
Amendment operates as a ceiling on the extent of the states’ 
immunity from suit. 
E. The Crises of the Civil War 
Another modality that can affect perceptions of textual clarity or 
ambiguity concerns the likely consequences of adopting one 
interpretation or another, a consideration that can become especially 
significant during times of crisis. Two episodes from the Civil War, 
one involving President Lincoln’s suspension of habeas corpus and 
the other involving the creation of the state of West Virginia, 
illustrate this point. 
1. Lincoln and Habeas Corpus.  The Constitution provides, in 
Article I, Section 9, that “[t]he Privilege of the Writ of Habeas 
Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or 
Invasion the public Safety may require it.”190 Because this Suspension 
Clause is located in Article I, which focuses on Congress, and because 
of structural concerns about Executive Branch aggrandizement 
through individual detentions, it is generally assumed that only 
Congress has the authority to suspend the writ. For example, in the 
 
 188. See generally, e.g., Manning, What Divides, supra note 114. 
 189. Cf. generally Easterbrook, supra note 94 (analyzing the question of what a legal text 
covers).   
 190. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. 
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Supreme Court’s 2004 “war on terror” decision in Hamdi v. 
Rumsfeld,191 all nine Justices appeared to share this assumption, 
despite otherwise disagreeing substantially about the issues of 
presidential power presented in that case.192 At the outset of the Civil 
War, however, President Lincoln authorized the military to suspend 
the writ without any action by Congress, which was out of session 
(during a time in history when congressional recesses were lengthy193). 
His action might be seen as a disregard of clear constitutional text, as 
informed by the constitutional structure, in the name of exigency. 
Support for such an interpretation could be found in the famous 
rhetorical question that Lincoln posed to Congress several months 
later: “[A]re all the laws, but one, to go unexecuted, and the 
Government itself go to pieces, lest that one [concerning habeas] be 
violated?”194 
The example is in fact more complicated than that. Lincoln’s 
principal argument concerning the suspension of habeas corpus was 
not that he needed to disregard one law in order to save other laws, 
but rather that he had not violated any law at all. Immediately after 
posing his rhetorical question, Lincoln stated that “it was not believed 
that this question was presented.”195 It was not presented, he 
maintained, because he believed that his actions were justified by a 
constitutional argument that engaged the text: 
[T]he Constitution itself, is silent as to which, or who, is to exercise 
the power; and as the provision was plainly made for a dangerous 
emergency, it cannot be believed that the framers of the instrument 
intended, that in every case, the danger should run its course, until 
Congress could be called together; the very assembling of which 
might be prevented, as was intended in this case, by the rebellion.196 
 
 191. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (plurality opinion). 
 192. See id. at 525 (“Only in the rarest of circumstances has Congress seen fit to suspend the 
writ. . . . At all other times, it has remained a critical check on the Executive, ensuring that it 
does not detain individuals except in accordance with law.”); id. at 562 (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(“Although this provision does not state that suspension must be effected by, or authorized by, 
a legislative act, it has been so understood, consistent with English practice and the Clause’s 
placement in Article I.”); id. at 592–94 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (appearing to assume that only 
Congress may suspend the writ). 
 193. See Michael B. Rappaport, The Original Meaning of the Recess Appointments Clause, 
52 UCLA L. REV. 1487, 1498 (2005). 
 194. Abraham Lincoln, Message to Congress in Special Session, in 4 COLLECTED WORKS OF 
ABRAHAM LINCOLN 421, 430 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953). 
 195. Id.  
 196. Id. at 430–31. 
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Regardless of whether this argument is ultimately persuasive, it seems 
at least legally plausible in light of the circumstances that Lincoln 
faced. These circumstances included not only open insurrection by a 
number of states, but also a military threat to the nation’s capital 
itself.197 
More generally, if suspension of the writ will sometimes be 
necessary when responding to an invasion or rebellion, as the 
Constitution appears to assume, such a necessity presumably could 
arise when Congress was out of session and when it was infeasible for 
Congress to assemble with sufficient speed to address the matter. If 
so, it is not clear why the Constitution would preclude what would 
otherwise be a necessary response in these circumstances, particularly 
when the clause is written in the passive voice. This sort of reasoning 
shows how purposive and consequentialist arguments can potentially 
combine with textual considerations to make what might otherwise 
seem to be clear about the constitutional text somewhat less clear. 
The habeas example also shows, however, that even in the 
context of an emergency threatening the very existence of the nation, 
the president and others took the constitutional text seriously. 
Lincoln felt obliged to explain how his actions accorded with the text, 
and there was a robust debate during the Civil War about whether his 
argument was persuasive.198 It is also worth noting that no other 
president has attempted to suspend the writ—not even President 
George W. Bush after the September 11, 2001 attacks, despite making 
otherwise robust claims about executive authority. Accordingly, even 
 
 197. See Curtis A. Bradley, The Story of Ex parte Milligan: Military Trials, Enemy 
Combatants, and Congressional Authorization, in PRESIDENTIAL POWER STORIES 93, 101–03 
(Christopher H. Schroeder & Curtis A. Bradley eds., 2009); see also DANIEL FARBER, 
LINCOLN’S CONSTITUTION 163 (2003) (“[A]lthough the constitutional issue can hardly be 
considered free from doubt, on balance Lincoln’s use of habeas in areas of insurrection or actual 
war should be considered constitutionally appropriate, at least in the absence of any contrary 
action by Congress.”). 
 198. For a list of pamphlets and other materials published on the question during the War, 
see the appendix to Sydney G. Fisher, The Suspension of Habeas Corpus During the War of the 
Rebellion, 3 POL. SCI. Q. 454, 485–88 (1888); see also JAMES G. RANDALL, CONSTITUTIONAL 
PROBLEMS UNDER LINCOLN 118 (1926) (“Perhaps no other feature of Union policy was more 
widely criticized nor more strenuously defended . . . .”). For a thorough canvassing of the public 
debate over the legality of suspension, see MARK E. NEELY, JR., LINCOLN AND THE TRIUMPH 
OF THE NATION: CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT IN THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 62–113 (2011). 
Lincoln’s argument was rejected by Chief Justice Taney, based in part on the location of the 
Suspension Clause in Article I. See Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144, 148 (C.C.D. Md. 1861). 
For a detailed account of the case, see generally BRIAN MCGINTY, THE BODY OF JOHN 
MERRYMAN: ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND THE SUSPENSION OF HABEAS CORPUS (2011). 
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though the clarity of the Suspension Clause may not be fully 
independent of purposive, structural, and consequentialist 
considerations, the text nevertheless appears to constrain, both inside 
and outside the courts. The phenomenon, again, is one of both 
construction and constraint. 
2. The Creation of West Virginia.  Before the Civil War, politics 
in Virginia had long been defined by a competition for power 
between the slave-rich eastern counties politically centered at 
Richmond and the slave-poor western counties centered at 
Wheeling.199 Unsurprisingly, this geographically identifiable cleavage 
in Virginia politics structured the intrastate dispute over secession 
from the Union in 1861. Whereas most Virginians emphatically 
supported secession after the Southern attack on Fort Sumter, 
Virginians in the northwest counties emphatically opposed 
secession.200 In May, delegates from twenty-five of the northwest 
counties met at an initial convention in Wheeling and voted to ask 
Richmond to approve the creation of a new state.201 They took more 
aggressive action once a state constitutional convention adopted an 
“Ordinance of Secession” and Virginians voted overwhelmingly to 
secede during the spring of 1861. After Union forces from Ohio 
crossed the river at Wheeling and Parkersburg and moved east into 
the mountains with help from local militia, delegates from thirty-nine 
counties held a second convention in Wheeling.202 John Carlile there 
proposed that the government of Virginia be reorganized. Existing 
state officeholders, he reasoned, were no longer entitled to hold their 
positions because they were trying to secede.203 
The convention delegates debated how to arrange the 
separation—specifically, whether the northwest counties should 
secede from Virginia or should instead re-form the government of 
Virginia. Carlile argued that secession was not a constitutionally 
available option in light of Article IV, Section 3, which provides that 
“no new State shall be formed or erected within the Jurisdiction of 
 
 199. See HOWARD GILLMAN, MARK A. GRABER & KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, 1 AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONALISM: STRUCTURES OF GOVERNMENT 282 (2013); D.W. MEINIG, 2 THE 
SHAPING OF AMERICA: A GEOGRAPHICAL PERSPECTIVE ON 500 YEARS OF HISTORY 481 
(1993). 
 200. GILLMAN ET AL., supra note 199, at 282–83. 
 201. MEINIG, supra note 199, at 481–82. 
 202. Id. at 482. 
 203. GILLMAN ET AL., supra note 199, at 283. 
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any other State; . . . without the consent of the Legislatures of the 
States concerned as well as of the Congress.”204 Agreeing with 
Carlile’s argument from the constitutional text, the convention 
delegates declared that their objective was not “to create a State, but 
to save one.”205 
The delegates may have been particularly attuned to the 
constitutionality of their actions because they were accusing the 
secessionists in Virginia of violating the Constitution and so did not 
themselves want to be seen as doing the same thing. Instead of 
ignoring the text, they developed a two-part plan that they deemed 
consistent with it. First, the convention would re-form the 
government of Virginia. This one true government of Virginia would 
be called “The Restored Government of Virginia.” Second, the 
convention would seek Congress’s consent to create a new state out 
of Virginia’s northwest counties.206 
And that is what the convention delegates did. Francis Pierpont 
was named the new governor, and delegates from the convention 
became the new state legislators.207 In July 1861, the delegates met at 
the new capital, Wheeling, the geographic center of the separation 
movement. There they filled various state offices and elected two U.S. 
Senators, John Carlile and Waitman Willey.208 The U.S. Senate 
recognized all of them as the legitimate representatives of Virginia.209 
Subsequently, a popular election was held on the formation of a new 
state, which the citizens approved by a ratio of almost twenty-four to 
one.210 They also ratified a new state constitution by an overwhelming 
margin.211 
Acting with dispatch, the legislature of this Unionist Virginia 
authorized the creation of a new state—“West Virginia”—within its 
territory, as required by Article IV, Section 3.212 Congress, whose 
 
 204. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3. For extended consideration of whether the semicolon in this 
clause means that states may never be created from territory within an existing state, see Vasan 
Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, Is West Virginia Unconstitutional?, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 291, 
332–95 (2002). The authors conclude that, although the text is ambiguous, the original 
understanding supports the constitutionality of forming new states in this situation. Id. at 395. 
 205. MEINIG, supra note 199, at 482. 
 206. Id.; GILLMAN ET AL., supra note 199, at 283. 
 207. GILLMAN ET AL., supra note 199, at 283.  
 208. Id. 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. The vote was 18,489 to 781. Id. 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. 
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consent was also required by the constitutional text, debated the West 
Virginia bill during June and July 1861 and imposed a condition 
precedent: to obtain admission, the citizens of the new state would 
first have to amend the proposed state constitution to provide for the 
eventual abolition of slavery.213 In December 1862, President Lincoln 
signed the enabling act that imposed this condition. Half a year later, 
in June 1863, he issued a proclamation recognizing the admission of 
West Virginia into the United States.214 Finally, “having completed 
this bit of legal legerdemain the federal government of Virginia 
shifted its headquarters to Alexandria.”215 
Whereas Confederate President Jefferson Davis approved the 
secession of Virginia from the Union, he condemned as “insurrection, 
revolution and secession” the creation of West Virginia out of the 
territory of Virginia.216 Lincoln, by contrast, vehemently condemned 
Virginia’s secession as lawless,217 but he heartily approved of West 
Virginia’s creation. Lincoln began by arguing that the creation of 
West Virginia was consistent with the textual requirement of 
Virginia’s consent. “A body claiming to be [Virginia’s] Legislature 
has given it’s [sic] consent,” he noted, and “[w]e can not well deny 
that it is such, unless we do so upon the outside knowledge that the 
body was chosen at elections, in which a majority of the qualified 
voters of Virginia did not participate.”218 It is universal practice, 
Lincoln further observed, “to give no legal consideration whatever to 
those who do not choose to vote,” which in this situation he 
contended would include by implication those who had decided to 
engage in open rebellion against the Union.219 
Lincoln also argued that the acceptance of West Virginia as a 
state was “expedient at this time.”220 He acknowledged that “[t]he 
 
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. 
 215. MEINIG, supra note 199, at 482. 
 216. JEFFERSON DAVIS, 2 THE RISE AND FALL OF THE CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT 306 
(1881). 
 217. GILLMAN ET AL., supra note 199, at 283. 
 218. Abraham Lincoln, Opinion on the Admission of West Virginia into the Union, in 6 
COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 26, 26 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953). 
 219. Id. at 27. See also Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 204, at 325 (“The legal fiction of 
Virginia’s consent to the creation of West Virginia follows logically as a sound conclusion from 
the sound premises that secession is unlawful and that the federal government has the power to 
recognize a lawful, alternative State government where rebellion has displaced the lawful, loyal, 
republican regime of a State with a traitorous government.”). 
 220. Lincoln, supra note 218, at 27–28. 
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division of a State is dreaded as a precedent,” but he claimed that “a 
measure made expedient by a war, is no precedent for times of 
peace.”221 He concluded by observing that “there is . . . difference 
enough between secession against the constitution, and secession in 
favor of the constitution.”222 Whereas John Carlile had interpreted the 
language of Article IV, Section 3, and adopted a workaround, Lincoln 
appears to have been gesturing toward an interpretation of the 
Constitution as a whole—to what he referred to as “the spirit of the 
Constitution and the Union.”223 On this reading of Lincoln’s words, 
distortions of the text in the service of preserving the Constitution 
when its existence is threatened are less legally problematic than 
distortions of the text that aim to destroy the Constitution. Rather 
than rest only on formalist grounds, as others have done,224 Lincoln 
confessed that stretching the text may sometimes be required to 
enable the constitutional project—including the unstretched text 
itself—to survive. 
Accordingly, Lincoln can be seen as having made two arguments 
regarding the creation of West Virginia, just as he did with respect to 
his suspension of the writ of habeas corpus at the outset of the Civil 
War. First, he argued that the constitutional text was satisfied when 
considered in context. Second and alternatively, he suggested that 
sometimes constitutional text that seems relatively clear will be 
viewed as less than clear if the exigency is great enough. Once again, 
one can see how the clarity or ambiguity of the text is partly 
constructed by the very interpretive modalities that it constrains. 
F. Recess Appointments 
The above examples highlight the potential influence of 
perceived purposes, structural inferences, conceptions of the national 
ethos, and consequentialist considerations in determining the clarity 
of the constitutional text. For a number of reasons, longstanding 
customary practice can also affect the perception of textual clarity.225 
The stakes are likely to be higher in this context because of 
 
 221. Id. at 28. 
 222. Id. 
 223. Id. at 27. 
 224. See generally Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 204 (offering an originalist analysis of the 
meaning of Article IV, Section 3). 
 225. See generally Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the 
Separation of Powers, 126 HARV. L. REV. 411, 430–32, 455–61 (2012). 
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expectation interests that have developed as a result of such 
practice.226 The existence of longstanding practice might also be 
viewed as carrying with it latent Burkean wisdom or at least a 
suggestion of workability.227 In addition, most interpreters feel some 
obligation to align interpretations with most practice, especially if the 
practice seems unlikely to change—for example, where there is 
unlikely to be judicial review, or where courts are unlikely to believe 
that they have the institutional capacity or democratic legitimacy to 
overturn the practice.228 This felt obligation probably stems from a 
number of psychological and jurisprudential considerations. 
Interpreters may desire to be relevant and influential, which may 
require that their assessments of the law be realistic. Of more 
theoretical significance, they may sense that the legitimacy of law 
requires some correspondence between the claims that it makes and 
the reality of its operation.229 
A recent example of the influence of customary practice on 
constitutional interpretation is the Supreme Court’s 2014 decision in 
NLRB v. Noel Canning.230 In that case, the Court interpreted the 
phrase “the Recess” in the Recess Appointments Clause of Article II, 
Section 2,231 as allowing the president to make recess appointments 
not only during the breaks between annual sessions in the Senate but 
 
 226. See id. at 425. 
 227. See id. at 426; see also Cass R. Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism, 105 MICH. L. REV. 353, 
408 (2006) (defending an approach to constitutional interpretation that emphasizes “the need to 
develop law with close reference to established practices and traditions”). 
 228. See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 225, at 429–30, 456. 
 229. Cf. DWORKIN, supra note 51, at 66 (“The justification need not fit every aspect or 
feature of the practice, but it must fit enough for the interpreter to be able to see himself as 
interpreting that practice, not inventing a new one.”); LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 
81 (1964) (discussing the importance of “congruence between official action and the law”). This 
does not mean that interpreters invariably align their perception of the clarity of the text with 
practice. For an important instance in which the Supreme Court concluded that longstanding 
governmental practice was inconsistent with clear text, see INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
In Chadha, the Court held that a “legislative veto” provision was unconstitutional because it 
violated the Presentment Clause of the Constitution, id. at 945, which requires that “[e]very Bill 
which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a 
Law, be presented to the President of the United States.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. The 
Court so concluded notwithstanding a substantial modern practice of including legislative veto 
provisions in regulatory statutes. 
 230. NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014). For additional discussion of this 
decision, see Bradley & Siegel, supra note 116. 
 231. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3 (“The President shall have Power to fill up all 
Vacancies that may happen during the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions which 
shall expire at the End of their next Session.”). 
BRADLEY SIEGEL IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 4/1/2015  5:38 PM 
1264 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 64:1213 
also during substantial breaks within the annual sessions.232 The Court 
next interpreted the phrase “vacancies that may happen” in the 
Clause as allowing the president to make recess appointments even 
for vacancies that occur before a recess.233 The Court also held, 
however, that in order for a break in Senate business to trigger the 
president’s recess appointments authority, the Senate must be out of 
session longer than three days and, absent extraordinary 
circumstances, at least ten days.234 Furthermore, the Court reasoned 
that “the Senate is in session when it says it is, provided that, under its 
own rules, it retains the capacity to transact Senate business.”235 
In reaching these conclusions, the Court relied heavily on 
customary practice, as well as on its view of the purpose of the Recess 
Appointments Clause. As a background proposition, the Court 
announced that, because the issues in the case “concern[ed] the 
allocation of power between two elected branches of Government,” it 
would place “significant weight upon historical practice.”236 In 
interpreting the phrases “the Recess” and “vacancies that may 
happen,” the Court then invoked historical practice, especially 
modern practice, in support of a reading of the Clause that permits 
broad presidential authority to make recess appointments.237 The 
Court also argued that this broad reading was supported by the 
Clause’s purpose of ensuring that the Executive Branch would 
continue to function effectively when the Senate was unable to 
consider nominations for Executive Branch positions.238 Historical 
practice and purposive considerations also informed the Court’s 
determination of the length of time required for a break in Senate 
business to constitute a “recess” for purposes of the Clause.239 
The majority premised its reliance on these nontextual 
modalities on the claim that the text of the Recess Appointments 
Clause was ambiguous.240 The Court thus appeared to accept the 
 
 232. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2567. 
 233. Id. 
 234. Id. at 2566–67. 
 235. Id. at 2574. 
 236. Id. at 2559 (emphasis removed). 
 237. See id. at 2561–64, 2570–73. 
 238. See id. at 2561, 2564, 2568. 
 239. See id. at 2566–67. 
 240. See id. at 2561 (“The constitutional text is thus ambiguous.”); id. at 2568 (“The question 
is whether the Clause is ambiguous.”); id. at 2577 (“We believe that the Clause’s text, standing 
alone, is ambiguous.”). 
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proposition, emphasized by Justice Scalia in his concurrence in the 
judgment, that clear text is controlling, regardless of other 
considerations.241 During the oral argument in the case, Justice Scalia 
repeatedly asked the solicitor general whether clear constitutional 
text could ever be trumped by longstanding practice.242 Although the 
solicitor general answered affirmatively, he also emphasized that it 
would be “extremely unlikely” for longstanding practice to develop in 
a way that is contrary to clear text.243 Unlike the solicitor general, no 
Justice in Noel Canning suggested that practice (or any other 
considerations) could prevail over clear text.244 
In part of its analysis, however, the Court articulated a thin 
understanding of ambiguity, allowing ready invocation of extratextual 
considerations. Critically for present purposes, this thin 
understanding seems itself to have been prompted in part by 
extratextual considerations. 
The Court plausibly concluded that the plain meaning of the 
phrase “the Recess” was linguistically ambiguous because the phrase 
could mean either the single break between yearly sessions of the 
Senate or any substantial break in Senate business. Even so, the 
Court gave significant weight to considerations of purpose and 
historical practice to confirm its claim that the phrase does not refer 
only to intersession recesses. As the Court explained: 
The upshot is that restricting the Clause to inter-session recesses 
would frustrate its purpose. It would make the President’s recess-
appointment power dependent on a formalistic distinction of Senate 
procedure. Moreover, the President has consistently and frequently 
interpreted the word “recess” to apply to intra-session recesses, and 
has acted on that interpretation. The Senate as a body has done 
 
 241. See, e.g., id. at 2617 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (“What the majority needs 
to sustain its judgment is an ambiguous text and a clear historical practice.”). 
 242. See Transcript, NLRB v. Noel Canning, No. 12-1281, at 6–8 (Jan. 13, 2014), available at 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/12-1281_3d9g.pdf. 
 243. See id. at 8. 
 244. In his dissent in Chadha, Justice White emphasized the longstanding practice of 
legislative vetoes but did not claim that such practice could override clear text. Instead, he 
argued that there was a “silence of the Constitution on the precise question.” INS v. Chadha, 
462 U.S. 919, 977 (1983) (White, J., dissenting). In particular, White reasoned that the 
Presentment Clause applies to exercises by Congress of “original lawmaking authority,” and 
that “[t]he power to exercise a legislative veto is not the power to write new law without 
bicameral approval or Presidential consideration.” Id. at 979–80. This distinction between 
disregarding the text and concluding that the text does not address a particular issue also 
characterizes the Supreme Court’s approach to the Eleventh Amendment. See supra Part II.D. 
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nothing to deny the validity of this practice for at least three-
quarters of a century. And three-quarters of a century of settled 
practice is long enough to entitle a practice to “great weight in a 
proper interpretation” of the constitutional provision.245 
It is even easier to see the influence of extratextual 
considerations on the Court’s finding of ambiguity for the phrase 
“vacancies that may happen.” As the Court acknowledged, “the most 
natural meaning” of the word “happen” as applied to the word 
“vacancy” is that the vacancy must occur during the recess.246 The 
Court insisted, however, that this was “not the only possible way to 
use the word,” because “happen” may also mean “exist.”247 The Court 
then concluded that the purpose of the Clause and historical practice 
supported the broader reading. These extratextual considerations 
were relevant, the Court said, because there was “some linguistic 
ambiguity.”248 If the Court’s understanding of the practice and the 
purpose of the Clause had not been contrary to the most natural 
meaning of the phrase, however, it seems unlikely that the Court 
would have described the text as ambiguous. But, as the Court stated, 
it was unwilling to “render illegitimate thousands of recess 
appointments reaching all the way back to the founding era.”249 
Justice Scalia’s concurrence, by contrast, argued that the relevant 
text was clear, and that it supported a substantially narrower recess 
appointments authority. Just as the majority’s perception of 
ambiguity seems to have been influenced by extratextual 
considerations, however, so too was Justice Scalia’s perception of 
clarity. Throughout his concurrence, and not merely in response to 
the majority’s’ contrary arguments, Scalia emphasized what he 
understood to be the purpose of the Clause, which was to operate as 
“a tool carefully designed to fill a narrow and specific need,”250 while 
“preserv[ing] the Senate’s role in the appointment process.”251 In light 
of this purpose, Scalia perceived that the Clause clearly prohibited 
the use of recess appointments to avoid senatorial opposition to 
appointees, even though such use has been characteristic of modern 
 
 245. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2573 (quoting The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655, 690 
(1929)). 
 246. Id. at 2567. 
 247. Id. 
 248. Id. at 2573. 
 249. Id. at 2577.  
 250. Id. at 2592 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 251. Id. at 2597. 
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practice. “The need [that the Clause] was designed to fill no longer 
exists,” he wrote, “and its only remaining use is the ignoble one of 
enabling the President to circumvent the Senate’s role in the 
appointment process.”252 
One can also discern in such statements, as well as certain 
statements in the majority opinion, the subtle but pivotal role of 
structural and ethos considerations in influencing each coalition’s 
perception of textual ambiguity or clarity. At a time when Americans 
are divided over whether it should be less or more difficult for the 
federal government to function in various ways, Justice Breyer, 
writing for the majority, invoked the authority of Alexander 
Hamilton for the proposition that “the vigour of government is 
essential to the security of liberty.”253 Scalia, in contrast, portrayed the 
structural provisions of the Constitution as “reflect[ing] the founding 
generation’s deep conviction that ‘checks and balances were the 
foundation of a structure of government that would protect 
liberty.’”254 In Noel Canning, Breyer’s and Scalia’s perceptions about 
the ambiguity or clarity of the Recess Appointments Clause appeared 
to reflect in part their hopes and fears about federal power. 
III.  IMPLICATIONS, OBJECTIONS, AND BENEFITS 
As the previous Part illustrated, constructed constraint is the 
phenomenon by which constitutional text that is perceived to be clear 
both constrains American interpretive practice and is constructed by 
that practice. This Part begins by identifying the implications of 
constructed constraint for several concepts in modern constitutional 
theory: “constitutional construction,” the “unwritten Constitution,” 
and the “Constitution outside the Constitution.” This Part then 
examines three possible objections to the theory of constructed 
constraint: that it is nonfalsifiable, that it reduces to disputes over 
methodology, and that it is all construction and no constraint. Next, 
this Part offers some generalizations about when the constitutional 
text is more or less likely to be subject to construction. Finally, this 
Part concludes by identifying certain benefits that the practice of 
constructed constraint helps to produce for the constitutional system. 
 
 252. Id. at 2598. 
 253. Id. at 2577 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 1 (Alexander Hamilton)). 
 254. Id. at 2593 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 
714, 722 (1986)). 
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A. Implications for Modern Constitutional Theory 
Recent work relating to the nontextual aspects of U.S. 
constitutionalism can be understood as efforts to better address two 
enduring issues in constitutional theory. The first is the tension 
between the “dead hand” problem and the countermajoritarian 
difficulty. The dead hand problem concerns the present authority of 
constitutional provisions approved long ago by people who are in 
many ways unrepresentative of current generations.255 The 
countermajoritarian difficulty concerns the legitimacy of having 
unelected judges override the choices of today’s majorities based on 
their interpretations of these provisions.256 When addressing one of 
these issues, interpretive theories often have trouble with the other. 
Originalist theories, for example, have a better answer to the 
countermajoritarian difficulty than they do to the dead hand problem. 
Variants of living constitutionalism, by contrast, have the opposite 
strengths and weaknesses.257 
The second issue in constitutional theory that is addressed by 
recent work on the extratextual Constitution is the need to account 
for the reality of constitutional change absent formal written 
amendments. One response to this perceived need has been to 
expand the understanding of what qualifies as constitutional law. The 
thought is that doing so might reduce pressures to formulate theories 
of constitutional change absent Article V amendments. The most 
prominent such theory to which scholars are responding is Bruce 
Ackerman’s submission that the Constitution can be amended as a 
result of certain “constitutional moments.”258 
This Article now considers several distinctions that theorists 
have drawn, at least in part, to address these two issues. 
 
 255. See, e.g., Brest, supra note 18, at 225 (“Even if the adopters freely consented to the 
Constitution, . . . this is not an adequate basis for continuing fidelity to the founding document, 
for their consent cannot bind succeeding generations. We did not adopt the Constitution, and 
those who did are dead and gone.”). 
 256. See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16 (1962) (“The 
root difficulty is that judicial review is a counter-majoritarian force in our system.”). Much 
scholarship in law and political science questions Bickel’s claim that the Court is a 
countermajoritarian institution, at least in any long-term sense. See generally, e.g., BARRY 
FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED THE 
SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION (2009).   
 257. See Michael C. Dorf, The Aspirational Constitution, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1631, 1656, 
1661–70 (2009); see also POST, supra note 165, at 42–43. 
 258. See generally 1 ACKERMAN, supra note 84, and 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 84; see also 
supra text accompanying note 84. 
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1. Constitutional Construction.  In recent years, a number of 
theorists have distinguished between “constitutional interpretation” 
and “constitutional construction.”259 It is not clear that all of these 
theorists have precisely the same concepts in mind when they make 
this distinction. In general, though, they use the terms to distinguish 
between constitutional determinations that are closely linked to the 
text (which they call “interpretation”) and those that supplement the 
text (which they call “construction”). For example, political scientist 
Keith Whittington—a leading proponent of the distinction between 
interpretation and construction—explains that interpretation “takes 
the text as its touchstone,” whereas construction does not “deal[] so 
explicitly and obsessively with the terms of the document itself.”260 
Randy Barnett has elaborated on this distinction. As he explains, 
construction takes place primarily when the text is unclear: 
Where the semantic meaning of the text provides enough 
information to resolve a particular issue about constitutionality, 
applying it will require little, if any, supplementation, and 
construction will look indistinguishable in practice from 
interpretation. That each state is entitled to two Senators requires 
little construction to apply. But however much information is 
contained in the text of the Constitution, there is not always 
enough information to resolve a particular issue without something 
more.261 
Construction, Barnett writes, is principally for situations in which 
there is not enough information “contained in the text.”262 Lawrence 
Solum agrees that practitioners are in “the construction zone” when 
the constitutional text is “vague or irreducibly ambiguous.”263 
Jack Balkin, in setting out his theory of “framework originalism” 
that is described in Part II.B, similarly relies on the distinction 
 
 259. This distinction is associated with a strain of scholarship called the “new originalism.” 
See Thomas B. Colby, The Sacrifice of the New Originalism, 99 GEO. L.J. 713, 714 (2011); 
Solum, supra note 2, at 467–68. 
 260. WHITTINGTON, supra note 2; see also Keith E. Whittington, Constructing a New 
American Constitution, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 119, 119–20 (2010) (“Interpretive practice is 
supplemented through a process of constitutional construction. . . . Construction picks up where 
interpretation leaves off.”). 
 261. Randy E. Barnett, Interpretation and Construction, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 65, 67 
(2011). 
 262. For a somewhat similar account of the distinction, see Solum, supra note 2, at 457.   
 263. Solum, supra note 2, at 467–68; see also Whittington, supra note 260, at 120–21 
(defining “the realm of construction” as the space in which “the Constitution as written cannot 
in good faith be said to provide a determinate answer to a given question”). 
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between interpretation and construction. Under Balkin’s account, the 
constitutional text establishes the basic framework of governance 
upon which participants in constitutional debates can build. Balkin 
expressly distinguishes the “ascertainment of the meaning” of the text 
from the activity of constitutional construction, which he says involves 
“arguments from history, structure, ethos, consequences, and 
precedent.”264 Constructions, as Balkin further explains, “exist to fill 
out and implement the text.”265 
By contrast, this Article understands the authoritative meaning 
of the constitutional text as being determined by a process of 
constructed constraint. This understanding of the text unsettles the 
distinction between interpretation and construction to the extent that 
defenders of this distinction aspire to describe constitutional 
practice—and not just to prescribe how practice should unfold. The 
considerations that are relevant to construction do not merely 
supplement the determination of the meaning of the text, and they do 
not come into play only when the text is unclear. Rather, they also 
affect the threshold assessment of whether the text is unclear. 
Construction, in other words, not only takes place on top of the 
textual framework, but also partially determines the framework itself. 
Accordingly, it is artificial to separate constitutional interpretation 
from the “construction zone.” 
One attraction of the idea of “constitutional construction,” as 
these theorists use the term, is that it makes originalism descriptively 
more accurate of existing practice. In particular, by acknowledging 
the phenomenon of constitutional construction, originalists have 
accepted the insight—emphasized by critics of originalism—that the 
Constitution sometimes enacts broad principles or standards rather 
than specific rules, and that in these situations the semantic meaning 
of the text does not—because it cannot—resolve concrete cases.266 
This concession is too strong for some originalists.267 The theory of 
constructed constraint suggests, however, that originalists have 
conceded too little ground, not too much. Participants in interpretive 
 
 264. BALKIN, supra note 2, at 4. 
 265. Id. at 54; see also Whittington, supra note 260, at 121 (“[C]onstitutional constructions 
are built within the boundaries, or to use Jack Balkin’s phrase, within the framework, of the 
interpreted Constitution.”). 
 266. Colby, supra note 259, at 731. 
 267. See generally, e.g., John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Original Methods 
Originalism: A New Theory of Interpretation and the Case Against Construction, 103 NW. U. L. 
REV. 751 (2009). 
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practice characteristically feel bound by constitutional text that they 
deem clear, but their perception of its clarity is often not determined 
primarily—let alone exclusively—by its original semantic meaning. 
2. America’s Unwritten Constitution.  The 1970s was a time of 
increasing debate between “interpretivist” and “noninterpretivist” 
approaches to the Constitution.268 This debate was triggered in part by 
the Supreme Court’s 1973 decision in Roe v. Wade.269 Two years later, 
Thomas Grey published a provocative article entitled Do We Have an 
Unwritten Constitution?270 Grey contended that, in addition to 
enforcing the written Constitution, courts properly had the 
“additional role as the expounder of basic national ideals of 
individual liberty and fair treatment, even when the content of these 
ideals is not expressed as a matter of positive law in the written 
Constitution.”271 
Grey’s account was partly descriptive. In arguing that courts 
were already playing such a role, Grey recited a number of examples 
in which the Supreme Court’s constitutional decisions seemed to him 
to have at most a limited grounding in the text. “The dominant norms 
of decision,” he argued, “are those large conceptions of governmental 
structure and individual rights that are at best referred to, and whose 
content is scarcely at all specified, in the written Constitution—dual 
federalism, vested rights, fair procedure, equality before the law.”272 
Critics of Grey included not only textualists, but also a group of 
scholars (including Owen Fiss) whom Grey would subsequently call 
 
 268. In 1980, John Hart Ely wrote that  
we are likely to call the contending sides “interpretivism” and “noninterpretivism”—
the former indicating that judges deciding constitutional issues should confine 
themselves to enforcing norms that are stated or clearly implicit in the written 
Constitution, the latter the contrary view that courts should go beyond that set of 
references and enforce norms that cannot be discovered within the four corners of the 
document.  
ELY, supra note 27, at 1. 
 269. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 270. Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703 
(1975). 
 271. Id. at 706. 
 272. Id. at 708. For additional writings by Grey relating to the unwritten Constitution, see 
Thomas C. Grey, Origins of the Unwritten Constitution, 30 STAN. L. REV. 843 (1978); Thomas C. 
Grey, The Constitution as Scripture, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1984) [hereinafter Grey, Scripture]; and 
Thomas C. Grey, The Uses of an Unwritten Constitution, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 211 (1988). For 
a more recent argument that conservative Justices are invoking forms of unwritten 
constitutional law, such as in the area of state sovereign immunity, see Jed Rubenfeld, The New 
Unwritten Constitution, 51 DUKE L.J. 291 (2001). 
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“rejectionists.”273 These scholars, according to Grey, maintained that 
“judges are always interpreting the constitutional text, but [that] this 
is not the kind of significant constraint on judicial activism that 
textualists think it is—the text, if read with an appropriately generous 
notion of context, provides as lively a Constitution as the most activist 
judge might need.”274 As a result, these scholars rejected the need for 
any division between interpretive and noninterpretive aspects of 
constitutional doctrine; for them, it was all interpretive, even when 
one included (for example) the Warren Court’s expansive approach 
to certain constitutional rights. 
Debates over the “unwritten Constitution” are now being 
revived in the wake of the publication of Akhil Amar’s important 
book America’s Unwritten Constitution.275 Notwithstanding its title, 
much of Amar’s book presents sophisticated arguments designed to 
show that the constitutional text, properly read, supports various 
well-accepted features of constitutional law, including some features 
that have been thought to have little connection to the text. In this 
sense, the book is more about the written than the unwritten 
Constitution, and is akin to the approach of the “rejectionist” critics 
of Grey’s defense of the unwritten Constitution. As David Strauss 
argues in reviewing Amar’s book, “[T]he theme [of the book] is that 
what might appear to be an unwritten constitutional practice—one 
with a tenuous connection to the text—actually has a secure basis in 
the text itself, as long as you pick and choose the right clause and read 
the text the right way.”276 Perhaps unsurprisingly in light of his 
common law approach to constitutional law, Strauss is critical of this 
theme. In his view, Amar’s strenuous efforts to connect constitutional 
doctrine to the text obscure the descriptive and normative importance 
of nontextual considerations in the development of constitutional law. 
The account of constructed constraint offered in this Article 
corroborates the proposition, emphasized by rejectionist critics of 
Grey and illustrated by Amar’s approach, that American interpretive 
practice does not readily acknowledge a freestanding unwritten 
Constitution. Even if their efforts may not be as energetic as Amar’s, 
 
 273. See Grey, Scripture, supra note 272, at 2; see also Fiss, supra note 45. 
 274. Grey, Scripture, supra note 272, at 2. 
 275. See AMAR, supra note 1. 
 276. Strauss, supra note 147, at 1560. An exception is Amar’s chapter on the “institutional 
constitution,” in which he discusses the importance of governmental practice in informing the 
powers of Congress and the president, while also noting that such practice “rarely goes against 
the canonical document.” AMAR, supra note 1, at 335. 
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interpreters typically try hard to connect their constitutional 
arguments to the text.277 At the same time, constructed constraint 
confirms the insight of Grey, Strauss, and others that much of 
importance in constitutional law cannot be found in the text. It is 
instead partially constructed from extratextual considerations. Even 
Grey and Strauss, however, distinguish sharply between clear and 
unclear text, and their support for an unwritten Constitution is 
focused on the latter category.278 Constructed constraint, by contrast, 
emphasizes that extratextual considerations can also be important in 
determining which portions of text are clear and which are unclear. 
Thus, the account of constructed constraint differs somewhat from 
both the rejectionist and unwritten Constitution perspectives, even 
while it recognizes that both perspectives capture important aspects 
of American constitutional practice. 
3. The Constitution Outside the Constitution.  Another 
distinction, developed most recently by Ernest Young and anticipated 
by Karl Llewellyn,279 is between the Constitution and the 
“Constitution outside the Constitution.”280 Young correctly notes that 
some of the functions typically ascribed to constitutional law, such as 
organizing the government and conferring individual rights, are often 
performed in the United States by nonconstitutional materials, such 
as federal statutes. In arguing that such “extracanonical norms” 
should be considered part of American constitutional law, Young 
contends that these norms can be at least as entrenched—that is, as 
“difficult to alter”—as other, well-accepted aspects of constitutional 
law.281 For example, Young notes plausibly that the statutory right to 
retirement benefits under the Social Security Act is less likely to be 
 
 277. See supra Part I.B; see also Sachs, supra note 1, at 1801 (“[A]s it happens, our social 
conventions don’t acknowledge any ‘unwritten Constitution’—at least not right now, and not in 
those terms.”). 
 278. See, e.g., Strauss, supra note 147, at 1535 (“The text obviously answers some important 
questions without any recourse to what might be called an unwritten Constitution: the length of 
the President’s term in office and how many senators each state has, for example.”); Grey, supra 
note 270, at 706 (acknowledging that “the Constitution is a written document, expressing some 
clear and positive constraints upon governmental power”). 
 279. See generally Llewellyn, supra note 59 (distinguishing between “the working 
Constitution” and the “Document”).  
 280. See Young, supra note 3, at 473. For an endorsement of this idea, see TUSHNET, supra 
note 3, at 6–8.  
 281. Young, supra note 3, at 413. 
BRADLEY SIEGEL IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 4/1/2015  5:38 PM 
1274 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 64:1213 
substantially changed in the coming years than the constitutional right 
to an abortion or the constitutional right to burn the American flag.282 
This concept of the “Constitution outside the Constitution” is 
valuable because it forces attention to what lies behind the use of the 
term “constitutional,” especially if this term is applied to materials 
that are not directly connected to the constitutional text. As Young 
suggests, moreover, a broader understanding of what counts as 
constitutional law might reduce pressures to formulate theories of 
how the “big-C” Constitution can change absent a formal 
amendment—such as Bruce Ackerman’s theory of “constitutional 
moments.”283 As discussed earlier, Ackerman’s theory, though 
controversial, aims to reconcile what appear to be significant changes 
over time in U.S. constitutional law with the existence of a written 
Constitution that is purportedly unchanging until amended. Adopting 
a broader conception of “the Constitution” is an alternative 
approach. 
Notwithstanding these virtues, there are potential difficulties 
with enlarging the boundaries of constitutional law in this manner. To 
justify the enlargement, Young emphasizes how nonconstitutional law 
can become entrenched, and he notes that “entrenchment may be all 
that sets the canonical Constitution apart from the rest of our legal 
system.”284 When Young describes laws like the Social Security Act as 
“entrenched,” he is referring to “the likelihood of fundamental 
change.”285 But the likely durability of a law or norm (such as the 
Social Security Act) does not by itself show that it is difficult to alter; 
it might just show that there is little desire to alter it.286 It can also be 
hazardous to hypothesize that particular nonconstitutional laws or 
norms are entrenched. For example, writing in 2007, Young 
reasonably suggested that the filibuster in the Senate was 
entrenched.287 We now know that Senate Democrats dramatically 
curtailed it in 2013.288 
 
 282. Id. at 427. 
 283. Id. at 455–56. 
 284. Id. at 426 (emphasis omitted). 
 285. Id. at 427. 
 286. See Levinson, supra note 76, at 702. For discussion of various possible meanings of 
entrenchment, see Primus, supra note 5, at 1137–38. 
 287. Young, supra note 3, at 427–28.  
 288. See Jeremy W. Peters, Senate Vote Curbs Filibuster Power To Stall Nominees, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 22, 2013, at A1. Although the filibuster is a longstanding procedure designed to 
protect minority interests in the Senate, it is not mandated by the constitutional text. The lack of 
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More fundamentally, when Young describes the entrenchment of 
nonconstitutional law, he is referring to political entrenchment—that 
is, the difficulty of overcoming “powerful constituencies.”289 As he 
seems to acknowledge elsewhere, however, political entrenchment 
does not fully capture what is typically meant in American 
interpretive practice by the entrenchment of constitutional law. To 
many observers, a fundamental aspect of constitutional law is that it is 
legally entrenched—meaning that it is not viewed as subject to change 
by the usual majoritarian processes for altering law.290 Instead, it is 
generally acknowledged that changes in constitutional law can occur 
both with an Article V amendment of the text and without it—most 
notably, through new Supreme Court interpretations. There is also 
some recognition that a longstanding accretion of practice might 
change constitutional law,291 especially for issues (such as separation 
of powers questions) that are unlikely to be decided by the courts.292 
But constitutional law is otherwise thought to be legally entrenched 
against alteration through the normal political process.293 This sort of 
legal entrenchment does not exist for the materials that Young 
identifies as the “Constitution outside the Constitution.” No one 
argues, for example, that Congress is legally precluded from altering 
or repealing the Social Security Act—and, in fact, Congress has 
 
a textual hook in this instance appeared to make it easier for Democrats to change the practice 
in response to charges that Republicans were abusing it. Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid 
argued, for example, that “[t]he Founding Fathers never had any place in the Constitution about 
filibusters or extended debate.” Burgess Everett, Harry Reid: Actively Weighing “Nuclear 
Option”, POLITICO (Nov. 19, 2013, 6:57 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2013/11/harry-reid-
filibuster-nuclear-option-100074.html. 
 289. Young, supra note 3, at 427. 
 290. Whereas Young’s conception of constitutional entrenchment is too permissive, others 
seem too restrictive. In discussing the entrenchment of constitutional law, Richard Primus refers 
to the proposition that “[c]onstitutional rules can be changed only through the process 
described in Article V.” Primus, supra note 5, at 1089. This conception of entrenchment is more 
restrictive than the prevailing understanding in American interpretive practice. As a 
consequence, Primus must conclude that constitutional law does not always have this 
characteristic of entrenchment. See id. at 1100. Similarly, Primus lists the availability of judicial 
review as an element of constitutional law. Id. at 1089. Because it may not be, however, he must 
note as part of his unbundling that constitutional law is not always associated with judicial 
review. Id. at 1115, 1117–18. 
 291. For a discussion, see generally Bradley & Siegel, supra note 116.  
 292. See generally Bradley & Morrison, supra note 225 (detailing the reliance on historical 
practice to help resolve separation of powers questions). 
 293. See, e.g., Dorf, supra note 77, at 89 (declining to include certain norms within the 
category of constitutional law “[i]f the relevant officials thought that, even absent special 
circumstances, they could amend one of these norms”). 
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altered the Act a number of times by raising the age qualifications to 
receive benefits.294 
The theory of constructed constraint further complicates the idea 
of the “Constitution outside the Constitution.” As previously 
discussed,295 the constitutional text has special attributes in American 
interpretive practice that distinguish it from other legal materials. In 
particular, it is almost never regarded as a legally acceptable move to 
argue for legislative (or other) disregard of the text. By contrast, even 
if it would be politically unpopular, it is a legally acceptable move to 
argue for legislative override of politically entrenched statutes (or 
other entrenched norms like the filibuster). No one argues, for 
example, that it would be unconstitutional to privatize Social 
Security. In other words, the phrase “the Constitution outside the 
Constitution” changes the meaning of the term “Constitution” from 
the first usage to the second in a way that elides critical differences in 
meaning and implications for constitutional practice. 
In addition, there are strong pressures in American interpretive 
discourse to tie constitutional arguments to the text. As Richard 
Primus notes, “It is a normal dynamic of American constitutional 
interpretation that people struggle to close the gap between the text 
and the set of rules that are recognized as entitled to supremacy, 
entrenchment, and judicial review.”296 These pressures do not apply, 
however, to the “Constitution outside the Constitution.” To return to 
the example of Social Security benefits, they may be entrenched, but 
no one argues that these benefits are required by the constitutional 
text. Such an argument, moreover, would almost certainly be rejected 
by a court. 
 
 294. Young makes clear that, even though he is categorizing various nonconstitutional 
norms as part of “the Constitution outside the Constitution,” he is not claiming that they have 
the same legal status as norms that are conventionally regarded as being part of the 
Constitution. See, e.g., Young, supra note 3, at 454 (“When I say that constitutional functions 
are often performed by ‘ordinary’ laws, I do not mean to suggest that such laws cease to be 
‘ordinary’ by virtue of those functions.”). This concession indicates that Young’s attempt to 
provide a broader account of “the Constitution” is made possible only by changing the meaning 
of the term. 
 295. See supra text accompanying notes 66–85. 
 296. Primus, supra note 5, at 1106; see also Dorf, supra note 77, at 75 (describing how 
interpreters in American constitutional practice seek to connect their arguments to the text of 
the Constitution); Strauss, supra note 147, at 1534 (“In American constitutional law, every claim 
about what the law requires must, in some way, be connected to the text of the written 
Constitution.”) (reviewing AMAR, supra note 1). 
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The above complications arise as a result of the “constrained” 
part of constructed constraint. The “Constitution” inside the 
“Constitution” constrains in a way that the “Constitution” outside the 
“Constitution” does not. The “constructed” side of constructed 
constraint further complicates the project of the “Constitution outside 
the Constitution.” Part of the goal of Young’s project, as noted above, 
is to broaden the scope of the “small-c” Constitution and thereby 
insulate the “big-C” Constitution from the need to accommodate 
constitutional change absent changes in the text,297 a need that 
theories like Ackerman’s account of “constitutional moments” seek 
to meet.298 Because the constitutional text is partially constructed, 
however, the big-C Constitution cannot be insulated in the manner 
attempted by the “Constitution outside the Constitution.” The 
determination of what is covered by the big-C Constitution is itself 
partially constructed, and the very considerations that will suggest the 
need for change are also likely to affect the construction. Regardless 
of its ultimate persuasiveness, Ackerman’s theory takes some account 
of the partial construction of the constitutional text, and his theory is 
one possible way to impose normative limits on this process. 
B. Objections to the Theory of Constructed Constraint 
This Section addresses three potential criticisms of the theory of 
constructed constraint. The first is that the descriptive account of 
practice offered by constructed constraint is nonfalsifiable. The 
second is that interpretive methodology will overwhelm the other 
factors that this Article has suggested are relevant to constructed 
constraint. The third is that American interpretive practice evidences 
only construction, not constraint. We consider each criticism in turn. 
1. Is the Theory Falsifiable?  One potential objection to the 
theory of constructed constraint is that it is nonfalsifiable. What 
would it take, someone might reasonably ask, to show that American 
interpretive practice is not constrained by perceptions of textual 
clarity, or that the perceived clarity of the text is not partially 
constructed by extratextual considerations? Regardless of whether 
falsifiability is a relevant concept when assessing the merits of 
particular approaches to interpretation, it does seem relevant when 
 
 297. Young, supra note 3, at 456–57. 
 298. See generally 1 ACKERMAN, supra note 84 (setting forth the theory of “constitutional 
moments”). 
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assessing claims, such as those made here, that purport to describe 
interpretive efforts. For example, it would be uncontroversial to label 
as “false” the descriptive claim that constitutional interpreters in the 
United States routinely consult astrology in making interpretive 
claims. By contrast, it would be controversial to describe as “false” 
normative theories of interpretation, such as variants of originalism or 
living constitutionalism. 
As an initial matter, a theory can be informative even if it is 
difficult to verify. Such a theory can, for example, provide a useful 
way of understanding certain aspects of human behavior and 
institutions. In any event, this Article is not intended to be an 
empirical study given the limited number of case studies that it 
discusses, and given the limited nature of its central claim. The 
Article purports to describe an important part of the practice of 
American constitutional interpretation; it does not purport to 
describe a phenomenon that always or inevitably occurs. This 
Article’s burden, therefore, is simply to show that constructed 
constraint does occur in materially important ways. This claim will be 
falsified only if it is shown that the phenomenon never occurs or 
occurs only in marginal or trivial cases. 
Although such falsification would be difficult, it would not be 
impossible. Regarding the proposition that the constitutional text is 
experienced as a constraint in American interpretive practice, there 
are at least two claims that could be addressed by empirical study. 
The first has to do with acceptable forms of constitutional argument, 
and the second has to do with the realities of constitutional practice. 
First, this Article has claimed that it is almost never regarded as 
an acceptable move in constitutional discourse to argue for a 
disregard of the constitutional text, even though it is an acceptable 
move to argue for a disregard of other materials, such as precedent 
and customary practice. It is possible to imagine evidence that would 
undermine this claim. For example, in debates in 2011 and 2012 over 
the extension of the debt ceiling, there were occasional calls for a 
disregard of constitutional text suggesting that only Congress could 
accomplish the extension, although they do not appear to have been 
taken seriously.299 Similarly, during the Supreme Court argument in 
 
 299. Many constitutional law commentators have concluded that the president lacks the 
unilateral authority to raise the debt ceiling in light of the Constitution’s specific assignment to 
Congress of the power “[t]o borrow [m]oney on the credit of the United States.” U.S. CONST. 
art. I, § 8, cl. 2. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The Constitution, Obama and Raising the Debt 
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Noel Canning, the solicitor general suggested that longstanding 
practice might trump clear text,300 but neither the majority nor the 
dissent endorsed the argument. 
Second, this Article has claimed that interpreters who favor a 
particular outcome sometimes regard the constitutional text as an 
obstacle to the achievement of that outcome. In the debate over the 
extension of the debt ceiling, for example, there appeared to be a 
widespread perception that the text was an obstacle to unilateral 
executive action, and the president made public statements to this 
effect. Although interpreters sometimes devise workarounds in the 
face of text that is deemed constraining (something that can be seen 
as another element of the “constructed” part of constructed 
constraint), this Article has further claimed that this very effort 
reveals the text to be having an effect, and that workarounds are 
neither always available nor always as efficacious as direct textual 
support. Though potentially difficult to obtain, evidence of internal 
political branch or judicial deliberations could undermine this claim if 
it showed that interpreters did not take the text seriously or perceived 
that effective workarounds were routinely available. 
Describing what it would take to falsify the construction 
component of constructed constraint is more challenging. This Article 
has claimed that American interpretive practice is not strictly 
textualist in that, when applying the text and determining whether it 
is clear, the practice often takes account of extratextual factors, such 
as the perceived purpose of the text, the constitutional structure, 
 
Ceiling, L.A. TIMES (July 29, 2011, 11:41 AM), http://opinion.latimes.com/opinionla/
2011/07/erwin-chemerinsky-on-why-obama-cant-raise-the-debt-ceiling.html; Laurence H. Tribe, 
Op-Ed., A Ceiling We Can’t Wish Away, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 2011, at A23. To the extent that 
others have questioned this conclusion, it has almost always been on the ground that some other 
portion of constitutional text might empower the president to raise the debt ceiling, such as the 
provision in Section 4 of the Fourteenth Amendment providing that “[t]he validity of the public 
debt of the United States, authorized by law, . . . shall not be questioned.” U.S. CONST. amend. 
XIV, § 4. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, The 14th Amendment, the Debt Ceiling, and a Way Out, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 24, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/25/us/politics/25legal.html. A few 
commentators have suggested that the constitutional text does not matter and that the president 
should act simply on the basis of the national interest. See, e.g., Eric A. Posner & Adrian 
Vermeule, Op-Ed., Obama Should Raise the Debt Ceiling on His Own, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 
2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/22/opinion/22posner.html. But this position has not 
enjoyed much support. Indeed, notwithstanding even the textual arguments made in support of 
presidential power, President Obama ultimately decided that he lacked unilateral authority to 
act. See David Jackson, Obama Says He Can’t Raise Debt Ceiling on His Own, USA TODAY 
(July 22, 2011, 5:30 PM), http://content.usatoday.com/communities/theoval/post/2011/07/obama-
speaks-at-university-of-maryland/1#.VG9WXYvF98E.  
 300. See supra notes 242–43.  
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claims about the American ethos, consequentialist considerations, 
and customary practice. Some textualists would likely concede this 
point as an empirical matter, even in arguing that the practice should 
be changed. For those who would object on empirical grounds, it may 
seem difficult to know what to look for in terms of falsifiability. We 
know that there is Bolling, which achieved the morally right result in 
part through construction. But where does one look to find the 
opposite of Bolling—that is, where does one look for cases in which 
interpreters eschew construction even though it would help them to 
achieve a preferred result? 
The task is made more difficult, to reiterate, by this Article’s 
embrace of only partial construction. Given this qualification, some 
unspecified number of textual applications that are inconsistent with 
extratextual considerations would not falsify the thesis. For example, 
it would not falsify the thesis to show that interpreters apply the text 
concerning two senators per state notwithstanding their belief that 
the consequences are undesirable. 
All that said, there may be ways to make an empirical analysis 
tractable. It would likely undermine the “constructed” component of 
this Article’s thesis if it could be shown that, when making claims 
about the text, interpreters routinely ignore the extratextual 
considerations described in this Article. Of course, the relevant 
interpreters would need to be defined, as would the critical adverb 
“routinely” in the above formulation. These are significant obstacles, 
but they should not be disabling if in fact there are many instances of 
constitutional interpretation that focus only on the semantic meaning 
of a constitutional provision. 
2. Is Construction Reducible to Methodology?  Another potential 
objection to the account provided here concerns the role of 
constitutional methodology. One might object that methodology, not 
the different modalities of constitutional interpretation, is in fact the 
central variable. Strict textualists, the argument might run, will not be 
open to considering the other extratextual factors described in this 
Article, in which case these factors will not affect their perceptions of 
textual clarity. By contrast, interpretive methodologies that are open 
to extratextual considerations will naturally take account of them. 
Methodology, on this view, is the gatekeeper of construction. 
The examples in Part II tend to rebut this contention. In those 
examples, Justices, presidents, advocates, and academics have not 
typically divided over methodology. Textualist-oriented Justices in 
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particular have not usually dissented from these acts of construction. 
For example, neither most textualists nor nontextualists have argued 
for limiting the First Amendment to Congress, and they have 
accepted Bolling’s reverse incorporation doctrine.301 Moreover, the 
textualist Justices have endorsed a vision of state sovereign immunity 
that goes well beyond the text of the Eleventh Amendment.302 
In effect, this Article claims that even self-identified textualists in 
constitutional interpretation often cannot help themselves: they, like 
adherents to other interpretive methodologies, partially construct a 
constraining text. To be sure, textualists may occasionally respond 
differently than nontextualists to the various extratextual 
considerations. Rather than generously interpret the textual provision 
in question, for example, they may search harder for alternative text 
(such as the Take Care Clause or the Due Process Clause) to support 
a particular result (such as the refusal to limit the First Amendment 
to Congress). Such efforts, which are common among textualist 
scholars,303 often appear to be inspired by the same purposive, 
structural, ethos, consequentialist, or practice-based concerns whose 
relevance they may purport to deny. What textualists typically will 
not do is ignore those considerations altogether. As noted in 
Subsection 1, this claim is subject to potential falsification. If it is 
correct, however, then methodology will not as a practical matter 
control whether the constitutional text is subject to construction. 
The embrace by “new textualists” of purposive and 
consequentialist considerations is evident in the area of statutory 
interpretation. For example, in Reading Law: The Interpretation of 
Legal Texts, Justice Antonin Scalia and legal lexicographer Bryan 
Garner reject the “plain meaning” approach to statutory 
interpretation that predominated during the early twentieth 
century.304 Rather than presume that the meaning of statutes is often 
 
 301. See supra Part II.B–C (discussing the applicability of the First Amendment to the entire 
federal government and the applicability of equal protection principles to the federal 
government). 
 302. See supra Part II.D. Textualist Justices have also supported the Court’s “anti-
commandeering” principle, which prohibits Congress from requiring states to enact, administer, 
or enforce a federal regulatory program, even though such a principle is not evident in any 
constitutional text. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997); New York v. United 
States, 505 U.S. 144, 149 (1992). 
 303. See supra note 143 (noting instances of such efforts). 
 304. ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF 
LEGAL TEXTS 53 (2012) (“Any meaning derived from signs involves interpretation, even if the 
interpreter finds the task straightforward.”); see, e.g., Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 
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obvious just from the statutory language itself, Scalia and Garner 
stress that such language must be understood in context—that 
“textual meaning” is to be determined “[b]y convention.”305 “Neither 
written words nor the sounds that the written words represent have 
any inherent meaning,” they observe.306 “Nothing but conventions and 
contexts cause a symbol or sound to convey a particular idea.”307 
For Scalia and Garner, “This critical word context” includes “the 
purpose of the text, which is a vital part of its context.”308 They 
thereby make clear that textualists, too, consider statutory purposes,309 
even as they reject resort to legislative history by insisting that “the 
purpose is to be gathered only from the text itself, consistently with 
the other aspects of its context.”310 Scalia and Garner also claim that 
the context of statutory language “embraces . . . a word’s historical 
associations acquired from recurrent patterns of past usage, and . . . a 
word’s immediate syntactic setting—that is, the words that surround it 
in a specific utterance.”311 They further include within their idea of 
“context” substantive canons such as constitutional avoidance, even 
though these canons appear to leave significant room for interpretive 
discretion and are “based on judicial-policy considerations alone.”312 
Reviewing the book, Judge Richard Posner criticized Scalia and 
Garner’s prescription that judges “look for meaning in the governing 
text, ascribe to that text the meaning that it has borne from its 
inception, and reject judicial speculation about both the drafters’ 
extratextually derived purposes and the desirability of the fair 
reading’s anticipated consequences.”313 Posner stressed their failure to 
follow their own instructions, marveling at “[t]he remarkable 
elasticity of Scalia and Garner’s methodology,” and claiming that they 
display a “lack of a consistent commitment to textual originalism.”314 
 
485 (1917) (“Where the language is plain and admits of no more than one meaning the duty of 
interpretation does not arise.”). 
 305. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 304, at xxvii. 
 306. Id. 
 307. Id. 
 308. Id. at 33. 
 309. Id. at 56 (“The difference between textualist interpretation and so-called purposive 
interpretation is not that the former never considers purpose. It almost always does.”). 
 310. Id. at 33 (emphasis omitted). 
 311. Id.  
 312. Id. at 31. 
 313. Richard A. Posner, The Incoherence of Antonin Scalia, NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 24, 2012, 
at 18, 23–24 (quoting SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 304, at xxvii).  
 314. Id. at 18.  
BRADLEY SIEGEL IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 4/1/2015  5:38 PM 
2015] CONSTRUCTED CONSTRAINT 1283 
Margaret Lemos, in her review, similarly observed that “this is not 
your grandmother’s textualism,”315 and that over time “the divide 
between textualism and its competitors has narrowed substantially.”316 
This narrowing of the divide is another reason why methodology is 
unlikely to predominate over the other considerations that are 
relevant in discerning textual clarity. Such a narrowing is also 
consistent with one of the themes of this Article, which is that the 
disagreement between textualism and broader interpretive 
approaches is less pronounced than is commonly thought.317 
3. Is There Only Construction, Not Constraint?  A third potential 
objection is that there is no middle ground between construction and 
constraint. The practice relating to the constitutional text that this 
Article attempts to capture, it might be argued, actually consists only 
of construction, as some critical legal scholars suggested during the 
1980s.318 Consistent with this objection, the examples discussed in Part 
II can reasonably be described as reflecting more construction than 
constraint. 
There is an important sense in which this objection is true. The 
constitutional text is, to reiterate, just marks on a page; it follows that 
textual meaning, ultimately, is entirely constructed one way or 
another. This insight, however, takes one only so far. Something can 
 
 315. Margaret H. Lemos, The Politics of Statutory Interpretation, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
849, 858 (2014) (book review). 
 316. Id. at 859; see also Lawrence M. Solan, The New Textualists’ New Text, 38 LOY. L.A. L. 
REV. 2027, 2028 (2005) (“Gone largely unnoticed in the battles between [textualists and others] 
during the past quarter century is the fact that both sides in the debate agree upon almost 
everything when it comes to statutory interpretation.”). But see Jonathan R. Siegel, The 
Inexorable Radicalization of Textualism, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 117, 120 (2009) (contending that 
“not only do the rival interpretive methods remain distinct, but the fundamental tenets of 
textualism cause the gap between interpretive methods to widen, not narrow, with time”). 
 317. As observed earlier, see supra note 7, the greater the variety of materials that 
textualists consider to be part of a defensible textual analysis—including whatever they deem to 
be part of the “context” of the text—the closer they will be to doing expressly what this Article 
suggests is often done implicitly. Textualists, however, are unlikely to agree that all of the 
modalities discussed in this Article are part of a defensible textual analysis. As an account of 
American interpretive practice, therefore, there is a divide between almost any version of 
textualism and the theory of constructed constraint set forth in this Article. This is true even if 
the divide is not as great as is typically characterized. As for which account is descriptively more 
accurate, it is worth bearing in mind that descriptive accuracy turns on the actual roles that are 
played by the various modalities, not on what particular interpreters assert those roles to be. For 
example, the fact that a self-identified textualist Justice declares that “the clear text” trumps 
historical practice or consequentialist considerations does not show that what he or she is calling 
clear text is independent in fact from those other modalities.  
 318. See supra Part I.A. 
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be constructed and yet still constrain. A brick wall is constructed, but 
it still hurts to run into it.319 
The key question is not whether the constraining effect of the 
constitutional text is constructed in some fashion—it is. Instead, the 
critical question concerns the nature of the constraint. There is a 
potentially significant difference in degree between situations in 
which the constraints arising from widely shared understandings 
about language and textual context permit little additional 
construction absent the most fanciful hypothetical circumstances, and 
situations in which interpretive meaning largely results from 
additional construction. It may be difficult, of course, to draw a line 
between the two—that is, between what is considered a “textual” 
matter and what is considered extratextual. Different interpreters will 
likely draw the line differently. But it is at least possible to talk of 
examples falling near one or the other end of the spectrum. 
Consider, for example, the Twenty-Second Amendment, which 
provides (among other things) that “[n]o person shall be elected to 
the office of the President more than twice.”320 Before this 
amendment, there was a strong unwritten norm against presidents 
serving a third term, based in part on the precedent established by 
George Washington.321 Nevertheless, some presidents (such as Ulysses 
S. Grant and Theodore Roosevelt) considered deviating from the 
norm,322 and Franklin Roosevelt did run for a third and then a fourth 
term. After the Twenty-Second Amendment, however, no one 
 
 319. See, e.g., Rapaczynski, supra note 82, at 177 (“The fact that no text by itself constrains 
interpretation . . . does not mean that interpretation is unconstrained; only that constraints 
operate within a particular context in which the text is interpreted.”); id. at 199 
(“[I]nterpretation is a practice that takes place in some social context, and in that context there 
are always some more or less definite limits on what can pass as a competent move within that 
practice.”). 
 320. U.S. CONST. amend. XXII. 
 321. See JAMES ALBERT WOODBURN, THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC AND ITS GOVERNMENT 
115 (1903) (“[I]t may now be said to be a part of the unwritten constitution that no President is 
eligible to a third term.”). But cf. HERBERT W. HORWILL, THE USAGES OF THE AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTION 99 (1925) (“The usage, if usage it may be, is not so firmly established as 
absolutely to deter an ambitious man from making the venture.”). 
 322. See generally MICHAEL J. KORZI, PRESIDENTIAL TERM LIMITS IN AMERICAN 
HISTORY 42–78 (2011) (detailing these attempts); Bruce G. Peabody & Scott E. Gant, The 
Twice and Future President: Constitutional Interstices and the Twenty-Second Amendment, 83 
MINN. L. REV. 565, 580–85 (1999) (discussing the views of several presidents on seeking a third 
term and the failed efforts by others to do so).  
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seriously contemplates having a president seek election for a third 
term.323 
Moreover, even though certain features of the Constitution are 
heavily criticized, almost no one thinks that, legally, these provisions 
can simply be disregarded. Examples include the Electoral College 
method of electing presidents,324 the requirement that the president be 
a “natural born Citizen,”325 and the provision requiring two senators 
per state.326 Presidential candidates who receive an Electoral College 
majority are widely accepted as having been legitimately elected, 
even when they place second in the popular vote, despite the fact that 
such a result may be difficult to defend as a matter of political 
morality.327 Likewise, it was widely believed that a constitutional 
amendment would be required for Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger 
of California, a naturalized citizen, to become president.328 And the 
requirement of two senators per state—no matter how great the 
difference in population between, say, California and Idaho—is 
particularly striking given how otherwise deeply entrenched is the 
judicially fashioned constitutional norm of one person, one vote.329 
The constitutional text has defeated application of this principle to 
the Senate. 
 
 323. See, e.g., Schauer, supra note 32, at 414 (“The parties concerned know, without 
litigating and without consulting lawyers, that Ronald Reagan cannot run for a third 
term . . . .”). But see Tushnet, supra note 31, at 687 (hypothesizing a situation in which this 
prohibition might be disregarded). Hypothesizing an unlikely scenario in which the text would 
be disregarded does not show that the text is unconstraining. Rather, it shows only that the text 
is not infinitely constraining. Cf. Schauer, supra note 32, at 422 (“The non sequitur . . . is the 
move from the proposition that language is not perfectly precise to the proposition that 
language is useless.”). 
 324. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. 
 325. Id. 
 326. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3. 
 327. Although the Electoral College has some defenders, it has been widely criticized and is 
unpopular with the public, and there have been numerous proposals either to eliminate it via 
amendment or to adopt a workaround. See, e.g., Alexander Keyssar, Do Away with the Electoral 
College, N.Y. TIMES (July 8, 2012, 10:01 PM), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/
2012/07/08/another-stab-at-the-us-constitution/revisiting-the-constitution-do-away-with-the-
electoral-college. 
 328. See, e.g., Kirk Semple, Schwarzenegger Backs Amendment To Allow Immigrant 
Presidents, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2004, at A14. 
 329. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 237 (1962).  
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C. When Construction Is More or Less Likely 
Part II illustrated, through a series of examples, the partial 
construction of the constitutional text in American constitutional 
practice. It did not attempt to theorize when construction is more or 
less likely to occur. There is cause for caution in attempting to offer 
any such account, because the phenomenon may be sufficiently 
contingent to defy ex ante specification. Even so, some 
generalizations, even if admittedly speculative, may be useful. 
First, there is substantial variation in the linguistic precision of 
the constitutional text, and such precision is likely to influence the 
extent to which the modalities of interpretation will affect perceptions 
of clarity and ambiguity. Whether a search is “unreasonable,”330 for 
instance, or whether a punishment is “cruel and unusual,”331 is 
substantially less linguistically precise than the requirement that “[n]o 
Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of 
Appropriations made by Law.”332 As Jack Balkin has explained, the 
Constitution consists of a mix of rules, standards, principles, and 
silences with different levels of specificity and precision.333 
Second, perceptions about consequences—including arguments 
resting on ideological, moral, or policy values—seem to play a 
particularly significant role in motivating and executing construction, 
but the practice is not simply reducible to consequentialism. On the 
one hand, interpreters are unlikely to construct away from what 
Richard Fallon has called the “first-blush” interpretation of the text 
unless they have concerns about the consequences associated with 
this interpretation.334 In addition, “arguments of value infuse 
arguments and influence conclusions within other categories,”335 such 
as whether to read a precedent narrowly or broadly or what 
inferences to draw from the institutional relationships established by 
the Constitution. On the other hand, it is also likely that perceptions 
about consequences are themselves affected by other modalities, such 
as purpose, structure, and ethos. 
 
 330. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 331. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
 332. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9. 
 333. See BALKIN, supra note 2, at 39.  
 334. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Three Symmetries Between Textualist and Purposivist Theories of 
Statutory Interpretation—and the Irreducible Roles of Values and Judgment Within Both, 99 
CORNELL L. REV. 685, 689 (2014). Fallon’s subject is statutory interpretation, but the idea of the 
“first-blush” meaning of a legal text is also useful in the context of constitutional interpretation.  
 335. Fallon, supra note 110, at 1238. 
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Third, the first-blush interpretation is more likely to hold if the 
constitutional provision relates to certain processes of government 
rather than to substantive outcomes such as rights. For example, 
governmental process provisions that concern the qualifications and 
method of election for federal offices tend to be “stickier” in general 
because they are needed for coordination so that actors can achieve 
their first-order objectives. Such provisions, in other words, enable 
democratic politics; they do not simply limit democratic politics. 
Moreover, other political actors typically have ample incentive to 
enforce them.336 
Fourth, construction seems particularly unlikely for numeric 
constitutional provisions. Numbers permit—or, at least, are perceived 
to permit—less linguistic argumentation than prose, and so tend to be 
stickier in American interpretive practice. For example, even though 
the age requirements and the specified term lengths for the 
presidency and Congress will negatively affect particular candidates 
and office holders, there are no serious efforts to read the 
requirements purposively or to otherwise challenge assumptions 
about how the requirements should be computed. This is not to say 
that numerical provisions are always clear. Nor do we mean to 
suggest that there is no scenario under which the meaning of an 
otherwise clear numerical provision could become unclear. The point, 
rather, is that it would take very unusual circumstances in order for 
this to happen. 
Fifth, construction is especially unlikely to occur when historical 
practice lines up in the same direction as typical plain meaning 
considerations. At least in that situation, historical practice seems to 
have an entrenchment effect.337 
 
 336. Even though the Court is unlikely to disregard constitutional text that it perceives to be 
clear, this does not mean that it will necessarily exercise judicial review to address what it deems 
a deviation from clear text. See supra note 75. Especially for certain issues relating to the 
processes of government, the Court may conclude that the deviation presents a nonjusticiable 
political question. See, e.g., Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 288–89 (1993) (applying the 
political question doctrine). But cf. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421, 1427 (2012) 
(describing the political question doctrine as a “narrow exception to th[e] rule” that “the 
Judiciary has a responsibility to decide cases properly before it”). 
 337. Thus, for example, whatever its normative appeal, interpreters are unlikely to adopt 
Matthew Stephenson’s suggestion that the Constitution be read to treat Senate inaction on 
appointments of principal officers as sufficient consent for purposes of the Appointments 
Clause, given that such an approach would have to overcome widespread perceptions of the 
meaning of the text that align with longstanding historical practice. See Matthew C. Stephenson, 
Essay, Can the President Appoint Principal Executive Officers Without a Senate Confirmation 
Vote?, 122 YALE L.J. 940 (2013). As noted earlier, the opposite is not necessarily true. That is, 
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D. Benefits of the Practice 
So far, this Article has attempted to describe an important 
feature of the role of the constitutional text in American interpretive 
practice; it has not sought to assess the normative implications of that 
feature. The Article has emphasized description over prescription in 
the belief that an accurate understanding of a social practice is both 
valuable in itself and an essential prerequisite to sound evaluation of 
the practice. With the Article’s descriptive account of constructed 
constraint in hand, this Section now sketches a normative defense of 
the practice. 
The practice of constructed constraint can be evaluated from two 
different points of view—from the external perspective of the analyst 
of the constitutional system, and from the internal perspective of the 
judge or practitioner. The internal perspective can be further divided 
into the individual and the systemic points of view.338 The individual 
perspective can be held by the faithful participant in constitutional 
practice—the citizen, politician, or judge who both makes claims on 
the Constitution and who seeks to comply in good faith with the 
Constitution. The systemic perspective evaluates a social practice 
from the standpoint of the constitutional system as a whole, not from 
the perspective of particular participants and their choice of conduct 
within the system. The systemic perspective asks, for example, 
whether a practice produces system goods. Such goods enhance the 
functioning of the constitutional system by improving its ability to 
accomplish its purposes, including by negotiating conflicts among 
different purposes.339 
Constructed constraint is primarily a descriptive account of part 
of U.S. constitutional practice from the external perspective, not a 
normative theory of how interpreters should decide particular 
constitutional questions from the internal, individual perspective. For 
example, constructed constraint neither validates nor condemns any 
of the interpretive positions taken by participants in the historical or 
 
historical practice that is perceived to be at odds with traditional plain meaning considerations 
does not inevitably result in construction. See supra note 230. 
 338. See BALKIN, supra note 2, at 328 (“In evaluating a constitutional and political system, 
we can focus our normative judgments on what individuals in a system should do within the 
system or on how the system operates as a whole.”); see also Siegel, supra note 92 (evaluating 
the individual and systemic perspectives from which Balkin reasons).  
 339. See BALKIN, supra note 2, at 328 (“Sometimes we should focus on improving individual 
behavior, but sometimes the system is the proper focus.”); id. at 328–29 (describing the 
individual and systemic perspectives). 
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contemporary debates used as examples in this Article—whether over 
the meaning of “Congress” in the First Amendment, the creation of 
West Virginia, or President Obama’s recess appointments. The theory 
itself cannot determine the proper balance between construction and 
constraint regarding any particular constitutional question. Nor can it 
determine what materials should inform construction in any given 
case. To take one of the modalities discussed in Part II, the effect of a 
consideration of consequences on constitutional construction will 
depend on the interpreter’s view of what consequences are relevant, 
the likelihood of their occurrence, and whether they are good or bad. 
The theory of constructed constraint cannot resolve such questions.340 
Constructed constraint does, however, act as a counterpoint to 
certain theories of constitutional interpretation to the extent that they 
purport to account for actual practice. In particular, this Article 
contends that constructed constraint is a descriptively better account 
of an important part of constitutional practice than approaches that, 
as a general matter, conceive of the text either as highly constraining 
or as not constraining at all. For example, strict versions of 
constitutional originalism and textualism seem unable to explain the 
construction and reconstruction of the constitutional text in which 
interpreters have engaged over the course of American history. At 
the same time, the constraint element of constructed constraint also 
rules out approaches that dismiss the possibility, let alone the 
constraining effect, of constitutional text that is perceived to be clear. 
The possibility of textually perceived constraint may help to explain 
why eminent constitutional scholars today, such as Strauss and 
Balkin, agree that clear text binds and differ only in the explanation 
that they offer for this phenomenon. This possibility may also help to 
explain why certain prominent constitutional scholars, such as Balkin, 
Tushnet, and Levinson, do not write today about constitutional 
questions in the way that they did in the 1980s. In particular, they now 
seem more interested in text, history, and doctrine than they were in 
 
 340. This Article primarily offers an external, descriptive account of an important part of 
constitutional practice; it does not suggest that participants in the practice should reason 
publicly in terms of constructed constraint. A distinct question is whether participants should be 
more aware of the phenomenon of constructed constraint. One virtue of a greater awareness is 
that participants would thereby gain a better appreciation of what they are—and are not—
disagreeing about. 
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the earlier period. One might say that the Big-C crits have become 
little-c crits.341 
If the normative implications of constructed constraint are 
limited from the individual perspective, these implications are more 
significant from the perspective of the constitutional system as a 
whole. From the systemic perspective, a key question is how the 
system functions over time to manage the constitutive tensions 
between the different values that are typically associated with 
constitutionalism. On the one hand, constitutionalism is widely 
thought to entail fundamental legal limits on politics, which help to 
make possible the rule of law by restraining the exercise of 
governmental power.342 On the other hand, it is also widely recognized 
that the rule of law itself has political foundations.343 It follows that 
constitutionalism also requires some measure of democratic 
responsiveness—some popular participation in the fashioning of 
constitutional limits.344 Mindful of this dimension of constitutionalism, 
presidents have often stressed the need for the Constitution to keep 
up with the times.345 
 
 341. Consider, for example, the contrast between Balkin’s Living Originalism and his critical 
and postmodern legal scholarship during the 1980s and early 1990s. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, 
Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 743 (1987); Jack M. Balkin, The 
Crystalline Structure of Legal Thought, 39 RUTGERS L. REV. 1 (1986); Jack M. Balkin, The 
Promise of Legal Semiotics, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1831 (1991); Jack M. Balkin, What is a Postmodern 
Constitutionalism?, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1966 (1992); see also Sanford Levinson, Jack Balkin as the 
Picasso of Constitutional Theorists, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 711, 712–13 (analogizing the shift in 
Balkin’s approach to shifts in the style of Pablo Picasso).  
 342. See Martin Krygier, Marxism and the Rule of Law: Reflections After the Collapse of 
Communism, 15 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY, 633, 642 (1990) (describing the rule of law as “a crucial 
and historically rare mode of restraint on power by law”); Joseph Raz, The Rule of Law and Its 
Virtue, in THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 210, 213 (1979) (arguing that the idea of the rule of law 
requires the government and the governed to “be ruled by the law and obey it”). 
 343. See, e.g., Carla Hesse & Robert Post, Introduction to HUMAN RIGHTS IN POLITICAL 
TRANSITIONS: GETTYSBURG TO BOSNIA 13, 20 (Carla Hesse & Robert Post eds., 1999) (“[T]he 
relationship between the governed and the governors necessary to sustain the rule of law 
. . . consists of specific practices that reflect trust and tacit social understandings.”); Neil S. 
Siegel, The Virtue of Judicial Statesmanship, 86 TEX. L. REV. 959, 966–67 (2008) (arguing that 
the ability of the governed to recognize the law as their own helps to maintain the relationship 
of trust that sustains the rule of law).  
 344. See, e.g., BALKIN, supra note 2, at 72 (“Nevertheless, mere conformity to professional 
discourse and professional practices is not sufficient for the Constitution to be democratically 
legitimate. It is not enough for the Constitution-in-practice to be law. It must also be our law. It 
must ultimately be responsive to the public’s values.”). 
 345. See, e.g., WOODROW WILSON, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED 
STATES 69 (1908) (“[T]he Constitution of the United States is not a mere lawyers’ document: it 
is a vehicle of life, and its spirit is always the spirit of the age.”); see also FRANKLIN DELANO 
ROOSEVELT, The Constitution of the United States Was a Layman’s Document, Not a Lawyer’s 
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There is relatively little tension between these two elements of 
constitutionalism—restraint and responsiveness—when the 
constraints imposed by the Constitution facilitate democratic 
decisionmaking, such as by structuring and facilitating democratic 
politics, as discussed in the previous section.346 There is also relatively 
little tension between them when practices of popular sovereignty 
reinforce constitutional limits, such as by promoting a democratic 
political culture of respect for the Constitution.347 In particular cases, 
however, constitutionalism and democracy can be in tension. Such 
tensions and conflicts lie at the heart of many debates in 
constitutional law, from gun rights to same-sex marriage, and from 
abortion to health care reform. A basic question in such cases is the 
extent to which the Constitution should be understood as restraining 
or responding to popular commitments. 
Robert Post and Reva Siegel have coined the phrase “democratic 
constitutionalism” to describe the paradoxical relationship between 
these two aspects of constitutionalism—“to express the paradox that 
constitutional authority depends on both its democratic 
responsiveness and its legitimacy as law.”348 “Americans,” they write, 
“want their Constitution to have the authority of law, and they 
understand law to be distinct from politics.”349 Moreover, “[t]hey 
understand that the rule of law is rooted in professional practices that 
 
Contract (Sept. 17, 1937), in 6 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. 
ROOSEVELT 359, 363 (Samuel I. Rosenman ed., 1941) (“[F]or one hundred and fifty years we 
have had an unending struggle between those who would preserve this original broad concept of 
the Constitution as a layman’s instrument of government and those who would shrivel the 
Constitution into a lawyer’s contract.”). 
 346. See also, e.g., ELY, supra note 27 (articulating a democracy-promoting theory of judicial 
review). 
 347. Cf. ROBERT C. POST, Between Democracy and Community: The Legal Constitution of 
Social Form, in CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS, supra note 142, at 189, 192 (stressing that even the 
constitutional value of individual self-determination “depends on the maintenance of 
appropriate forms of community life”—specifically, “community institutions designed to 
inculcate this value”). Mandatory public education in the United States is a prime example of 
such a community institution. Id.; see also Abraham Lincoln, Address Before the Young Men’s 
Lyceum of Springfield, Illinois, in 1 COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 108, 112 (Roy 
P. Basler ed., 1953) (desiring that obedience to the Constitution and laws “become the political 
religion of the nation,” and that “the old and the young, the rich and the poor, the grave and the 
gay, of all sexes and tongues, and colors and conditions, sacrifice unceasingly upon its altars”). 
 348. Post & Siegel, supra note 12, at 27. For Post and Siegel’s initial, more elaborate 
development of the theory of democratic constitutionalism, see generally Robert Post & Reva 
Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 373 
(2007). 
 349. Post & Siegel, supra note 12, at 27. 
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are distinct from popular politics.”350 Even so, Post and Siegel stress, if 
the public comes to view the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the 
Constitution as wholly unresponsive to popular commitments, then 
“the American people will come in time to regard it as illegitimate 
and oppressive, and they will act to repudiate it as they did during the 
New Deal.”351 
How, then, can the Constitution “function as our fundamental 
law, as the limit and foundation of politics, and yet remain 
democratically responsive”?352 Political commitments may become 
constitutional law in various ways. First, Article V amendments are 
rare but have not been impossible over the course of American 
history. Second, electoral politics results in acts of constitutional 
interpretation and institution building by the political branches, as 
well as the appointment of Justices and judges.353 Third, the public 
may engage in efforts to change social norms, whether through social 
movement advocacy, litigation, or both. Fourth, norm contestation 
may also occur through the rhetoric of presidents and other 
influential politicians.354 “To succeed in changing social norms,” 
Balkin observes, “may be as powerful as changing judges and 
politicians, for it alters the underlying sense of what is reasonable and 
unreasonable for governments to do. It shifts political and 
professional discourse about what is off-the-wall and on-the-wall in 
making claims on the Constitution.”355 
Constructed constraint illuminates both the limits and the 
potential of non–Article V pathways of constitutional change. The 
fact that interpreters feel bound by clear constitutional text enables 
the Constitution to partially insulate itself from these pathways. But 
the ability of interpreters to work with the text renders the 
 
 350. Id. at 27–28. 
 351. Id. at 28; see also id. at 25–26 (observing that “important aspects of American 
constitutional law evolve in response to substantive constitutional visions that the American 
people have mobilized to realize,” and that “these responsive features of the law help sustain 
the Constitution’s authority in history”). 
 352. Id. at 28; see also BALKIN, supra note 2, at 71 (“The democratic legitimacy of the 
Constitution depends on the people’s belief that their Constitution and their government 
belongs to them, so that if they speak and protest and make their views known over time, the 
constitutional constructions of courts and the political branches will eventually respond to their 
political values and to the issues they care about most.”). 
 353. See generally Balkin & Levinson, supra note 68 (articulating their theory of partisan 
entrenchment through judicial appointments). 
 354. See BALKIN, supra note 2, at 70–71; Post & Siegel, supra note 12, at 28. 
 355. BALKIN, supra note 2, at 71.  
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Constitution more democratically responsive, animating the text with 
the values and needs of the people whom the text purports to 
govern.356 In other words, constraint empowers the Constitution to 
discipline politics, and the construction of constraint vivifies 
constitutionalism by infusing it with popular commitments. 
In negotiating tensions within constitutionalism between 
restraint and responsiveness, constructed constraint attends to the 
two enduring issues in constitutional theory that were noted in Part 
III.A: the dead hand problem and the countermajoritarian difficulty. 
The constraint element of constructed constraint helps to ameliorate 
the countermajoritarian difficulty by framing and channeling judicial 
discretion in constitutional adjudication. The construction part of 
constructed constraint enables interpreters to reduce the dead hand 
problem in practice by facilitating constitutional change, not only 
through judicial decisionmaking, but also outside the courts—and not 
only through written or unwritten constitutional amendments, but 
also through working with the text that they already have. 
CONCLUSION 
Recent scholarship has explored whether and why participants in 
American interpretive practice feel bound by constitutional text that 
they perceive to be clear. Other work has asked how the text can be 
built upon by other materials. This Article, by contrast, has suggested 
that it is important to take account of the extent to which the 
perceived clarity of the constitutional text is itself constructed. The 
clarity of constitutional text is partially constructed, this Article has 
explained, because over time, interpreters work on or around the very 
text to which they feel bound. 
The model of constructed constraint offered here navigates 
between strict textualist accounts of the constitutional text and critical 
accounts that regard the text as unconstraining. By deemphasizing the 
distinction between clear text and extratextual considerations, the 
idea of constructed constraint also unsettles the relationship between 
interpretation and construction, between the written and unwritten 
constitutions, and between the Constitution and the “Constitution 
 
 356. Cf. Robert C. Post & Neil S. Siegel, Theorizing the Law/Politics Distinction: Neutral 
Principles, Affirmative Action, and the Enduring Legacy of Paul Mishkin, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 
1473, 1474 (2007) (arguing that the distinction between constitutional law and politics creates 
the possibility of the rule of law, but that the uncertain and shifting boundaries of the distinction 
help to legitimate the law by infusing it with popular commitments). 
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outside the Constitution.” As a normative matter, the practice of 
constructed constraint is an important way in which interpreters work 
out the potential tensions within democratic constitutionalism 
between fidelity to the rule of law and responsiveness to popular 
ideals. 
 
